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“By metaphysics, I do not mean those abstract 
considerations  of  certain  imaginary properties,
the principal use of which is to furnish the 
wherewithal for endless dispute to those who  
want to dispute. By this science I mean the 
general truths which can serve as principles for 
the particular sciences.”
Malebranche
Dialogues on Metaphysics and Religion 
1. The interminable agony of metaphysics
Throughout  the  twentieth  century,  numerous  philosophers  sounded  the  death  knell  of 
metaphysics. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Rudolf Carnap, Martin Heidegger, Gilbert Ryle, J. L. Austin, 
Jacques Derrida, Jürgen Habermas, Richard Rorty, and, henceforth, Hilary Putnam: a great many 
tutelary figures have extolled the rejection, the exceeding, the elimination, or the deconstruction of 
first  philosophy.  All  these  necrological  chronicles  do  not  have  the  same  radiance,  the  same 
seriousness, nor the same motivations, but they all agree to dismiss the discipline, which in the past 
was considered “the queen of the sciences”, with a violence at times comparable to the prestige it  
commanded at the time of its impunity. Even today, certain philosophers hastily spread the tragic 
news with contempt for philosophical inquiry,  as if  its  grave solemnity bestowed upon it  some 
obviousness. Thus, Franco Volpi writes:
‘Grand metaphysics  is  dead!’ is  the  slogan which applies  to  the  majority  of  contemporary  
philosophers, whether continentals or of analytic profession. They  all treat metaphysics as a 
dead dog.1
In  this  way,  the  “path  of  modern  thought”  would  declare  itself  vociferously  “anti-
metaphysical and finally post-metaphysical”. Is this to say that, on the brink of the twenty-first 
century, metaphysics is henceforth reducible to the historical study of a corpus forever closed and 
irrelevant  to  the  present  day?  Must  everyone  stifle  in  the  prison  of  their  sheepish  minds  this 
“metaphysical need” which Arthur Schopenhauer praised for its universality? To respond to these 
falsely ingenuous questions, it is advisable to reopen the dossier of the death certificate for the nth 
time.
* This text was conceived as a synthetic introduction to the present-day situation of metaphysics and of ontology, to 
their stakes and their practices in the world and in France, by way of a preamble to the activities of the Atelier de 
métaphysique et d’ontologie contemporaines [Workshop on Contemporary Metaphysics and Ontology] at the École 
normale supérieure. It certainly does not claim to replace the more informed and complete works on which it rests, 
and which are indicated in the bibliography. Nor was it written with the intention of being polemical against 
whatever conception of metaphysics, even if it goes without saying that the question is approached in a necssarily 
partisan, though resolutely conciliatory, manner.
2It is not possible – nor desirable – to recall all of the critiques that “metaphysics” has given 
rise to since Immanuel Kant, without taking the pains of defining what one means by this term. 
Here  it  will  suffice  to  review  the  most  important  metaphysics  of  the  last  century,  by  partly 
synthesizing the patient analysis of the question that Frédéric Nef carried out in  Qu’est-ce que la 
métaphysique ?2 ; an “unrewarding task”, in his own words, but necessary for attempting to justify 
the role of metaphysics and disentangle its contemporary stakes. Particular attention will be paid to 
the Heideggerian critique, given its considerable influence on German and French philosophy up to 
the present. Moreover, it would not be incorrect to claim that the majority of subsequent attacks 
against metaphysics are inherited from the criticisms made by the author of Being and Time, in one 
way or another. However, in another tradition the anti-metaphysical accusations were no less violent 
nor less resounding: the famous current initiated at  the beginning of the twentieth century that, 
despite the ambiguity of the expression,3 we customarily call “analytic philosophy”,4 and which 
corresponds to the majority of international philosophical publications today. Paradoxically, and in 
contrast  to  the  majority  of  other  philosophical  traditions,  metaphysics  flourishes  among  the 
“analytics” today, even though they sometimes continue to be associated with a hostility towards 
first philosophy, despite the fact that this only applies to a relatively brief period of their history.5 In 
this first retrospective moment, we will nevertheless examine with the same care the “analytic” 
attempts  to  devalue  metaphysics,  which  can  be  subsumed  schematically  under  four  rubrics: 
therapeutic  quietism,  logical  positivism,  ordinary  language  philosophy,  and  contemporary  anti-
realism. 
If we exclude the already outmoded Comtian, neo-Kantian, and Nietzschean critiques, we 
may think that the kick-off to the anti-metaphysical offensive in the twentieth century began with 
Wittgenstein. Let us examine the ante-penultimate proposition (6.53) from the  Tractatus logico-
philosophicus:
The right method of philosophy would be this: To say nothing that except what can be said, i.e. 
the propositions of natural science, i.e. something that has nothing to do with philosophy: and 
then always, when someone else wished to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him 
that  he  had  given  no  meaning to  certain  signs  in  his  propositions.  This  method would  be 
unsatisfying to the other – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy 
– but it would be the only strictly correct method.6
The  critique  is  radical:  metaphysics  is  a  vain  and  illusory  discourse;  it  cannot  say  anything 
legitimately about what it claims to speak of, and as a result can only lead to nonsense. In the 
preamble to his French translation, Gilles Gaston Granger classically defines the Tractarian project 
as one of a “negative philosophy”, by comparing it to the negative theology of the Neo-Platonic 
tradition, which for Plotinus culminated in an apophatic silence. Granger summarizes the stakes of 
the work:
The  Tractatus aims not to say what the reality of the world is, but rather to delimit what is 
thinkable  about  it,  that  is  to  say,  expressible  in  a  language.  And  only  the  true  or  false  
propositions of science would satisfy this demand. The discourse of the philosopher can only 
make the correct functioning of language manifest, and show the illusory character of its use 
while claiming to go beyond a [properly scientific] description of the facts.7
Thus, the great questions of metaphysics cannot receive a response, but only “an answer which 
cannot be expressed[;] the question too cannot be expressed” (6.5) It follows that the metaphysician 
must purely and simply cease talking, as in the famous conclusion of the Tractatus: “Whereof one 
cannot  speak,  thereof  one  must  be  silent.”  (7)  Such  is  the  halting  point  of  Wittgenstein’s 
3“therapeutic”  perspective:  once  the  nonsense  of  metaphysical  statements  is  diagnosed,  only 
quietism can be prescribed as the ultimate remedy. Nevertheless, a non-discursive space appropriate 
to “metaphysical” questioning will be reserved in the margins of the expressible. Wittgenstein calls 
this the mystical: “There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical.” (6.522) 
(and “[n]ot  how the world is, is the mystical, but  that it is” (6.44)). What  cannot be said shows  
itself;  such is the somewhat enigmatic consequence of the Tractarian path.8 One could however 
conclude with a “naïve” reading of the set of propositions where Wittgenstein contradicts himself, 
since the first section of the work concerns questions of an eminently ontological nature. This is  
why we must of course be careful to read the Tractatus, despite its title, as a systematic treatise. We 
can see the Austrian philosopher situate a  partially discursive progression towards “Ethics” at the 
heart of his undertaking. We can also suggest that the ontology of states of affairs sketched in the 
first section is only one step along the path that it tries to exceed.9 Nevertheless, it is difficult to 
systematically examine the Wittgensteinian critique of metaphysics in a non-aporetic way, precisely 
because the discourse of the  Tractatus appears to exempt itself from the limits of the discursive 
system that the impalpable horizon of the “mystical” reveals. Moreover, the text from 1921, both so 
short  and  so  dense,  presents  many  hermeneutic  difficulties  that  continue  to  sustain  a  prolific 
literature.10
From the  Tractatus,  the Vienna Circle11 – a philosophical group active in the 1930s and 
formed especially around the emblematic figures of Carnap, Otto Neurath, and Moritz Schlick – 
maintained above all the maxim according to which “everything which can rightly be said can be 
said clearly”12,  and not the quietist conclusion Wittgenstein drew from it – the relations between 
Wittgenstein and the members of the Circle on this subject were quite ambivalent, as evidenced by 
one of Carnap’s notes.13 From this perspective, another step of the critique of metaphysics is made 
with  the  article  published  in  1931  in  the  journal  Erkenntis,  “The  Elimination  of  Metaphysics 
Through Logical Analysis of Language”, especially in response to Heidegger’s 1929 lecture, “What 
is  Metaphysics?”  Carnap  claims  in  his  article  that  “the  alleged  statements  in  this  domain  [of 
metaphysics] are entirely meaningless.” According to him, the statements of this “doctrine” have no 
true significance simply because they do not satisfy a certain number of necessary semantic and 
epistemological conditions. Carnap writes that to be significant, a sentence S which contains the 
word a, the elementary sentence S(a), must fulfill four conditions:
(1) “The empirical criteria for a are known.”
(2) “It has been stipulated from what protocol sentences ‘S(a)’ is deducible.”
(3) “The truth conditions for ‘S(a)’ are fixed.”
(4) “The method of verification of ‘S(a)’ is known.”14
For instance, words like “absolute”, “spirit”, “being-for-itself”, and even “being” tout court do not 
fulfill the first condition because they have no generally accepted empirical criteria (they can only 
be defined approximately by other words). Let us consider the following sentence:
Spirit knowing spirit is consciousness of itself; and is to itself in the form of objectivity. It  is 
[...]15
The second condition is not fulfilled (the sentence is deducible from no protocol sentence), nor is 
the third condition, and certainly not the fourth condition. Therefore, Carnap concludes with the 
idea that metaphysical “pseudo-statements” are not the expression of existent states of affairs, but 
rather of a Lebensgefühl, of an “attitude towards life”.
The  same  kind  of  examination  leads  Schlick  in  “Erleben,  Erkennen,  Metaphysik”16 to 
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neither the cognitive anticipation of a result which must then be duly proved (by mathematical 
intuition, for example), nor the flash of genius of the researcher in the field of empirical knowledge 
(such as Archimedes’ legendary “eureka!”), this is because it precedes from nothing other than mere 
“lived experience”: “the metaphysician has no wish to know things; he wants experience of them”, 
that is to say “by making them into contents of his consciousness”. Thus intuitive knowledge of the 
transcendent would be pure illusion, because the content of a lived experience is simply a content of 
consciousness,  immanent by definition.17 It follows, according to Schlick, that knowledge is the 
domain restricted to the true sciences:
All knowledge of what exists is obtained in principle by the methods of the particular sciences; 
any other ‘ontology’ is empty babble.
It remains for the epistemically empty-handed metaphysician to turn towards “poetry and art and 
life  itself,  which  multiply  by  their  stimuli  the  wealth  of  contents  of  consciousness,  of  the 
immanent”.18 
However, the validity of these critiques is contestable for an obvious reason: the conditions 
of  verification  imposed  on  metaphysical  statements  appear  absurd,  for  even  statements  of 
theoretical physics, for example, are not expected to satisfy the same conditions. If the criticism that 
some philosophical prose is really just nonsense seems justified,19 it is utterly inadequate to extend 
this  criticism  to  every  form of  metaphysics.  Each  form  of  metaphysics,  far  from  necessarily 
culminating in mysticism or poetry, can be rational and systematic – a certain number of respectable 
philosophers,  from  Aristotle  to  Charles  Sanders  Peirce  and  beyond,  have  even  understood 
metaphysics as science (see section 2). Let us summarize the criteria of Carnapian verificationism. 
The first condition rather vaguely concerns the nature of “empirical criterion”. Frédéric Nef remarks 
“that  there  is  no  empirical  criterion  of  gravitation  for  Newton”.20 The  second  condition  is 
considerably  problematic:  do  pure  “protocol  sentences”  exist?  Let  us  imagine  that  a  chemist 
deduced from the protocol sentence P “the gauge indicates that there are 15 ml of solution in the test 
tube” a conclusion about the solubility of an element. On the one hand, P presupposes a set of  
concepts and scientific hypotheses (which do not depend on the protocol, but rather on the theory). 
On the other hand, such a sentence leaves itself open to subjectivism, for it strictly depends on the  
observer making the statement.21 The third condition clashes with epistemological holism which 
demands  that  the  truth  condition  of  a  sentence  depend on the  truth  condition  of  the  group of 
sentences and of the theoretical framework in which it is produced. It is thus far from clear whether 
or  not  we  can  individually  attribute  truth  conditions  to  a  single  sentence.  Finally,  the  fourth 
condition,  by  including  the  necessity  of  knowing  the  “verification  process”  of  the  sentence, 
paralyzes the formulation of metaphysical hypotheses, which,  by definition,  are not empirically 
verifiable, but nevertheless can be systematically defended with the help of different formal and 
conceptual tools22 (see sections 6 through 8). Therefore, it seems difficult to accept the Carnapian 
criteria,  which  discredit  as  a  whole  many  philosophical  statements  and  even  some  scientific 
statements. Moreover, did not Carnap himself write as a metaphysician when he wrote The Logical  
Structure of the World,23 thus coming within the scope of his own critiques?
Carnap’s  article  was explicitly directed against  Heidegger’s  equivocal  expressions (think 
back to the famous analysis of the “pseudo-sentence”  das Nichts nichtet [the Nothing nothings]). 
Heidegger was not slow to respond – without ever citing Carnap’s name – in his  Introduction to 
Metaphysics:
In this journal [Erkenntnis, the journal of the Vienna Circle] has appeared a treatise entitled: 
“The Elimination of Metaphysics Through Logical Analysis of Language”. Here one completes 
5the  extreme  flattening  and  uprooting  of  the  traditional  doctrine  of  judgment  through  the 
semblance of mathematical scientificity.”24
Ironically,  however,  it  was Heidegger himself  who adopted the originally Carnapian idea of an 
Überwindung,  of  an  “overthrowing”  of  metaphysics.  Richard  Sylvan  summarizes  well  this 
paradoxical chassé-croisé in the Germanic territory:
More than a little curiously, overthrowing of metaphysics also became an objective of German 
contemporaries of the Vienna circle, whose very work […] offered paradigmatic examples of 
what the circle aimed likewise to demolish and bury forever. Heidegger, like Wittgenstein – by 
a procedure with some remarkable similarities, aimed at dissolving the questions – proposed to  
overcome metaphysics.25
The Heideggerian critique is well-known. Metaphysics substitutes for the ontological question – the 
question of being – a twofold “ontic” question: what is the nature of common “beingness” (ens 
commune) for all  beings? And what is,  among beings, the supreme being (summum ens) at the 
foundation  of  the  totality  of  being?  It  is  through  this  surreptitious  substitution  that  Western 
metaphysics would be constituted as “onto-theo-logy”, which amalgamates being either with what 
is common to every being (object of metaphysica generalis, or ontology), or with the highest being 
in the causal order, God (object of  metaphysica specialis, or theology). Thus the being of being 
would  remain  unquestioned,  unthought,  because  the  “ontological  difference”  deployed  by 
metaphysics since Aristotle brackets the famous Seinsfrage, the “question of being”.
In spite of this expeditious reconstruction, Heidegger’s relation to metaphysics and to its 
possible “exceeding” is particularly complex and ambiguous, all the more so due to its considerable 
development  in  the texts.  We can attempt to reconstruct  the course of this  development  in  the 
clearest  possible  way  in  three  stages.  Heidegger  had  first  planned  on  phenomenologically 
destroying traditional  ontology,  in  order to put  a more originary science in  place to serve as a  
veritable  foundation  for  philosophy  –  thus  remaining  faithful  to  the  Husserlian  project.26 He 
successively named this undertaking, in the texts which immediately preceded and followed Being 
and Time, “originary theoretical science” (1919), “hermeneutics of facticity” (1923), then “analytic 
of existence” and “fundamental ontology” (1927). He then attempted, in Kant and the Problem of  
Metaphysics (1929),  to  define  a  “metaphysics  of  Dasein […]  not  just  [as]  metaphysics  about 
Dasein,  but  [as] the metaphysics  which occurs necessarily  as Dasein”.27 The same year,  in  his 
seminar “What is Metaphysics?”, he declared that “Metaphysics is the fundamental occurrence in 
our  Dasein. It is that  Dasein itself”. Human being is the only being to originally possess a clear 
consciousness of  being:  human being is immediately  Dasein,  “Being-there”, disclosure of being 
beyond beings. As a consequence, Heidegger considered at this stage that true metaphysics must be 
deployed in the space opened by human Dasein, in a fundamental ontology comprising the anxiety 
of  being  faced with  nothingness  –  such  is  the  project  expressed  in  Being  and Time.  But  “the 
beingness” of  Dasein, its ultimately ontic nature, would not know how to begin the ontological 
inquiry  that  Heidegger  hoped  for.  The  identification  of  metaphysics  with  Dasein appears  as 
untenable,  since  it  privileges  a  particular  ontic  being  in  order  to  think Being  ontologically. 
Following the Carnapian attacks, the Freiburg philosopher thus radicalized his undertaking towards 
an “exceeding of metaphysics” (Überwindung der Metaphysik) explicitly expressed, as brought to 
light by its “onto-theo-logical formation” in the Introduction to Metaphysics in 1935. The thesis of 
onto-theo-logy  would  allow  him  to  find  the  “still  unthought unity  of  the  essence  [Wesen]  of 
metaphysics”28 in order to show the profound insufficiency of it: the forgetting of being. Finally, in 
his later work, Heidegger arrived at the thesis of the end of metaphysics, which would henceforth be 
surpassed  by  the  essence  of  modern  technology.  Modern  technology  would  therefore  be  the 
accomplishment  of  metaphysics,  and  metaphysics,  in  turn,  would  become  the  prehistory  of 
6technology.  Faced  with  the  metamorphosis  of  metaphysics  into  modern  technology,  Heidegger 
recommended a  Verwindung  in place of the  Überwindung:  the pure and simple abandonment of 
metaphysics to itself,  without wanting to change anything in it – to overcome (verwinden) rather 
than to go beyond or to exceed. In “Time and Being”, the last word of Heidegger on the subject is  
almost quietist, in the form of a double renunciation: renouncing the exceeding of metaphysics by 
purely and simply ceasing to take it into consideration:
To think Being without  beings means:  to think Being without regard to metaphysics. Yet a  
regard for metaphysics still prevails even in the intention to overcome metaphysics. Therefore, 
our task is to cease all overcoming, and leave metaphysics to itself.29 
What can one conclude from the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics and its successive 
transformations? In its  first  form, namely the destruction of traditional ontology in favor  of an 
existential analytic of Dasein, it comes within the scope of the Carnapian critique, in the sense that, 
reformed in light of the experiences of Husserlian phenomenology, the project of this metaphysics 
culminated well and truly in the expression of a  Lebensgefühl, that, in a somewhat arbitrary way, 
places anxiety and being-for-death at the heart of the “question of being”. One can undoubtedly 
claim, following Franco Volpi, that
Carnap was preoccupied with establishing the truth conditions of philosophical discourse, while 
Heidegger, abstracting from the problem of validity, by sometimes freely crossing the limits of 
language, determined to show how disclosures of meaning take place.30
But that is certainly the problem. Heidegger ignores the question of his discourse’s validity and, in a 
general way avoids all  epistemological examination concerning metaphysical knowledge, which 
would only serve to elevate, following Henri Bergson, the role of intuition. Moreover, it would be 
very easy to refer it to the mysterious “disclosure of meaning” which one would be hard pressed to 
give a precise definition of. The thesis of the “ontotheological” formation is undeniably interesting 
in that it offers an original reading of the history of metaphysics since Aristotle. However, it does 
not withstand a thorough historical examination, as numerous works have shown.31 Let us quote 
Jean-François Courtine, who cannot be accused of not understanding the Heideggerian project, nor 
of being hostile towards him:
It  is  important  to  critique the unproductive violence of  what  Janicaud had quite  justifiably 
named the destinal historialism [of the ontotheological formation]. To broaden the concept of  
metaphysics beyond the ontotheological could then concretely mean: to develop once again a  
vast and differentiated concept in order to attribute it to philosophers who, especially in the neo-
Platonist tradition, were devoted to thinking the One beyond being […].32
We ought to wonder about what Heidegger offers in place of the metaphysical tradition led astray 
by ontotheology. The response is far from evident, and Heidegger’s texts prove to be particularly 
ambiguous on this point, since his philosophy, as Pierre Aubenque writes, leads to “an unachievable 
hermeneutics,  which  never  leads  to  an  intuition  which  would  put  an  end  to  the  conflict  of 
interpretations [of the discourses on being] by proving some and disproving others”.33 Ultimately, 
Heideggerian ontology is  resolved – is  dissolved – in a “history” of being,  that is  to  say,  in a 
historico-hermeneutic approach to the question of being.34 This is why, in the last analysis, one 
could  argue  that  Heidegger’s  decisive  contribution  was  not  that  he  “exceeded”  or  “overcame” 
metaphysics, but that he founded long-term historical work on the evolution of the “question of 
being”, which was constituted, one could say, paraphrasing Whitehead, by a series of notes (and 
misinterpretations!) on the writings of Plato and Aristotle. On this point, Jean-François Courtine’s 
work on Suárez and above all on the genesis of the  analogia entis35 are paradigmatic, that is, the 
7Heideggerian project is recuperated by the project of an “archeology”36 of the problem of being, in a 
perspective aimed towards the future of metaphysics:
Why is the ‘archeological’ question discussed today, after the end of the ‘end’ of metaphysics?  
To attempt to respond to this question involves risking several ‘important’ hypotheses that we 
intend to submit to critical discussion: the ‘archeological’ question, by the very formation of the 
question, always presupposes something like a post-Kantian, post-Nietzschean, and, above all, 
post-Heideggarian horizon, within which only the status of metaphysics and of its fundamental 
project is determined. In other words, the ‘archeological’ objective presupposes the possibility,  
and, no doubt, the necessity of a ‘repetition’ of metaphysics, of ontology, and of the question of 
being.37
It is no doubt here where we can locate the real, or at least the most contemporary, posterity of the  
Heideggerian project, which paradoxically involves a rigorous critique of the Heideggerian reading 
of the history of metaphysics.
Let us examine the final stage of the Heideggerian critique of metaphysics, which claims 
quite simply “to overcome” metaphysics: it is not difficult to discern the impasse that this attitude of 
indecision or indifference leads to. The Heideggerian formulation of the problem of being, at this 
stage, avoids the concepts of metaphysics, ontology, and even Dasein, in order to address the much 
more elusive notion of  Ereignis, “event”, “occurrence”.38 Pierre Aubenque summarizes this final 
shift, which resembles a renunciation:
Little by little, Heidegger [renounced] the nostalgia of the origin [of the meaning of being], and 
the pretense of finding it again. The thought about being had always already begun, since being  
is always already there, not as a being already present, but as an event always already appearing 
and therefore non-datable.39 
In truth, the final analysis of the “question of being” appears largely aporetic, for it only leads to a  
form  of  radical  limitation  on  philosophical  discourse  that  does  not  fail  to  remind  us  of  the 
Wittgensteinian characterization of the inexpressible.40
After  Heidegger,  phenomenology takes  a  “hermeneutic  turn”41 which  radicalizes  certain 
tendencies  of  the  author  of  Being  and  Time42,  while  changing  vocabulary and  terrain.  Against 
Heidegger, Hans-Georg Gadamer and Paul Ricœur affirm the plurivocity of metaphysics. For the 
former “there is absolutely not a language of metaphysics”, but rather “there are only metaphysical 
concepts, whose content is determined by their use”43, whereas the latter refuses “the convenience, 
which has become a laziness in thinking, of lumping the whole of Western thought together under a 
single word, metaphysics”.44 The hermeneutic project does not repeat the catchword – the end itself 
or the exceeding – of the prophecies of the end of metaphysics, but instead emphasizes the temporal 
and historical  character of our relation to being.  Gadamer maintains the idea that metaphysical 
questions  are  Lebensfragen,45 “vital”  questions,  and  for  this  reason,  unavoidable questions. 
However,  according to him, this  questioning élan makes us aspire to know what  is  beyond all 
knowledge, outside of reach: “the ignoramus is the fundament of transcendence.”46 Unlike science, 
metaphysics therefore allows no real progress: we must limit ourselves to a metaphysics of finitude. 
Empowered by this Kantian denunciation of the unknowable, Gadamer characterizes metaphysics 
above all as attitude. These are the “echoes of human experiences, which […], from the lived world, 
make us understand the relation to the transcendent or to the divine.”47 Once more, this definition of 
metaphysics comes within the scope of the criticisms of the Vienna Circle. Metaphysics is thought 
of as a human activity that is valued only as an experience of “astonishment” when faced with the 
strangeness of the world, for “it is precisely in asking these unanswerable questions that we affirm 
our humanity.”48 Elsewhere, the tone becomes almost soteriological:
8[M]etaphysics signifies an opening into a dimension which, endless as time itself and flowing 
presence as time itself, embraces all our questions, our saying and hoping.49 
Behind this impassioned celebration of a metaphysics with a human face hides a radical weakening 
of its meaning and role. Nevertheless, at this price the possibility of metaphysics is maintained. The 
Derridean project of deconstruction is not as charitable. Derrida wanted to radicalize the critique 
that, according to him, Heidegger had not been capable of completing. However, he thinks that one 
cannot invalidate metaphysics as false, since one would have to make use of a concept of truth that 
is itself bound by metaphysics. Our time, Derrida writes, is marked by an event that coincides with 
the advent of structural linguistics: the liberation of writing vis-à-vis the tutelage of logocentrism. 
Structuralism excludes the speaker in order to exclusively consider language as a system of signs 
caught  in  their  reciprocal  relations  (and  not  in  reference  to  an  extra-linguistic  signified).  This 
“event” is the sign of a liberation from “presence”:
By alluding to a[n ancient] science of writing reined in by metaphor, metaphysics, and theology,  
[one sees] that the [new] science of writing – grammatology – shows signs of liberation all over 
the world, as a result of decisive efforts.50
The Heideggerian inspiration of the deconstruction of metaphysics becomes clear by its emphasis 
on its historical determination:
The unity of all that allows itself to be attempted today through the most diverse concepts of 
science and of writing, is,  in principle,  more or less covertly yet  always,  determined by an 
historico-metaphysical epoch of which we merely glimpse the closure.51
Nevertheless, Derrida is confronted with the “problem of the status of a discourse that borrows from 
the tradition instruments that he needs in order to deconstruct this very tradition.”52  This is why 
every Derridean enterprise is marked by a negative philosophy, that is to say, by a philosophy that 
proceeds by differentiating itself from tradition and “institutional” discursivity. The author of the 
Grammatology confesses that it  is impossible to define deconstruction without ruining the very 
project of it, for operating at the heart of this project is the “notion” of  différance, which is not 
properly  speaking  a  concept,  but  a  “non-concept”.  Pierre  Aubenque  locates  three  origins  of 
différance:53 
(1) Heidegger’s ontological difference: the difference between Being concealed and the being 
that one claims to substitute in its place.
(2) Saussure’s linguistic difference: language is defined as a system of differences, since only 
semiotic differences are producers of meaning.
(3) Neo-Platonist  diastasis,  which  corresponds  to  the  active  meaning  of  diastèma,  “the 
interval”, “the distance”; this meaning appears in the Plotinian and Augustinian definitions 
of time as distensio animi.
According to Pierre Aubenque, we can therefore attempt to summarize the Derridean critique of 
metaphysics – even if doing so undoubtedly does some violence to it:
Metaphysics closes,  encloses difference:  difference between being and beings,  différance  as 
ecstatic  temporalization,  difference  as  condition  of  meaning.  For  difference,  metaphysics 
substitutes  the  presence of  a  fundamental  or  substantial  principle:  ousia,  parousia, 
transcendental signified. For ecstatic  Dasein, which does not know itself (man, Kant already 
said, is only the phenomenon of himself), metaphysics superimposes and finally substitutes the 
9substantiality of the subject, hypo-keimenon, subjectum, owner of itself.54
Through this “assessment”, and to validate it by example, Derrida intends to employ the tool of 
deconstruction  as  a  “bricolage”,  “which  comes  down  to  using,  as  instruments,  fortuitously 
encountered elements that have a different purpose than one employs them for: for example, to 
finish demolishing a house with materials salvaged from the collapse of the house itself.”55 But to 
what extent can we take seriously this “internal subversion of concepts”? Is not the emancipation 
announced as liberating towards all the canonical criteria of rationality, the open door to a smug and 
chaotic logorrhea? Moreover, do we not run the risk, in the name of the seductive imperative of  
subversion, of isolating and of arbitrarily overstating contingent details of this or that metaphysical 
discourse? All these questions are always asked by a critical reader of Derrida. Several studies56 
have elsewhere shown the logical  inconsistencies  that  dangerously punctuate  his  texts,  without 
mentioning  his  pronounced  tendency  towards  Hermeticism  to  the  detriment  of  the  clarity  of 
reasoning – all  that,  of  course,  in  the  name of  a  refusal  to  submit  to  the  alienating  norms of  
traditional  rationality.57 The  impossibility  of  defining  key  terms  such  as  deconstruction  or 
différance, other than through metaphors and neologisms, reveals a real difficulty for Derrida in 
developing a  systematic critique of metaphysics without entering into an obscure “beyond” that 
exempts the discourse from every logical and argumentative structure. In short, we can legitimately 
be doubtful of the validity of this procedure, for even though the philistines of deconstruction claim 
to  have  a  monopoly  on  philosophical  modernity,  especially  in  the  field  of  literary  studies, 
deconstruction, in fact, became an institutional language, which, moreover, has yet to be toppled.
The  last  significant  post-Heideggerian  avatar  in  the  exceeding  of  metaphysics  can 
undoubtedly be sought in Jürgen Habermas, who was particularly explicit on the question. Indeed 
he coined the expression “postmetaphysical thought” in 1988.58 The reasons why we have at our 
disposal  “no  alternative  solution  to  postmetaphysical  thinking”  are,  according  to  him,  four  in 
number:
(1) The appearance of a “new type of procedural rationality” calls into question the primacy of 
“totalizing thinking that aims at the one and the whole”.
(2) The  “detranscendentalization of  inherited  basic  concepts”  linked  to  the  advent  of  the 
historical and hermeneutic sciences in the nineteenth century reflects “the new experiences 
of time and contingency within an ever more complex modern society”.
(3) The reification of forms of life, as well as an objectivistic view of science and technology, 
are criticized from then on, foreshadowing a “shift in paradigms from the philosophy of 
consciousness to the philosophy of language”.
(4) The primacy of theory over  practice is  called into question by the access of  “everyday 
contexts of action and communication” to a philosophical dignity.59 
The presuppositions of such a discourse are numerous. In the first place, the implicit definition of 
metaphysics is based on certain more or less arbitrary characteristics: the primacy of the model of 
relations between subject and object, the primacy of the totalizing discourse regarding the One and 
the Whole, the primacy of theory over practice. Thus, at the very least, a schematization of Hegelian 
dialectics acts as a model to obsolete metaphysics. Moreover, Habermas admits that he neglects, “in 
a  rough simplification  […] the  Aristotelian  line”,  and that  he  identifies  metaphysics  with  “the 
thinking of a philosophical idealism”60 extending, according to him, from Plato to Hegel. Faced 
with the new contemporary irrationalism that he condemns in Jaspers,  Heidegger,  Wittgenstein, 
Derrida,  and  Adorno,  Habermas  judges  that  it  is  necessary  not  to  reestablish  (rationalist) 
metaphysics, but to substitute for it a “situated reason” cognizant of the transformation of rationality 
in our modern societies. Yet, Frédéric Nef comments:
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[P]arallel to this irrationalist current, which is certainly the most visible and the most popular  
[…] a multitude of currents in metaphysics emerged that accounted for the problems raised by 
Habermas (finitude, secularization, loss of the primacy of theory, etc.), from the metaphysical  
pragmatism  of  a  Peirce  to  Husserl’s  formal  ontology,  via  all  the  developments  of  neo-
Meinongianism, Whitehead’s process metaphysics, the renaissance of debates about the validity 
of transcendental arguments in the normative sciences, etc. They were at least enough to thwart 
contemporary irrationalism, which is perhaps a mass effect.61
In addition to these historical considerations, we can wonder about the validity of Habermasian 
reasoning when it relies on general and little justified declarations about modern “rationality”, or 
even  about  the  supposed  necessity  of  “deflating  the  extra-ordinary”,  discreetly  expressing  a 
fetishization – even a mythification – of the everyday that Heidegger is known for.  In the last  
analysis, the Zeitgeist, “the spirit of the times”, remains Habermas’ obscure horizon, which serves to 
condemn the vanity of a rehabilitation of metaphysics: what good is it struggling against his time,  
while at the same time pretending to ignore the evident obsolescence of the old metaphysics? This 
so-called (strategic) evidence was really just an unquestioned prejudice lacking support.
After having provided a broad outline of Wittgenstien’s, Carnap’s, and Heidegger’s theses, 
and some “post-Heideggerian” critiques of metaphysics, we will now treat two anti-metaphysical 
positions that are firmly anchored in the analytic tradition and still occasionally defended. The first 
corresponds to what is usually called “ordinary language philosophy”, and is inherited from the 
work of the later Wittgenstein. The main postulate can be summarized in the following way: a 
careful analysis of ordinary language allows the “dissolution” of traditional philosophical problems. 
In 1932, the Oxford philosopher  Gilbert  Ryle insisted on the idea that  this  type  of  analysis  of 
language  can  clarify  our  mode  of  thought  by  eliminating  inappropriate  linguistic  forms:62 
philosophical problems are born from a misinterpretation of our ordinary use of language. The main 
task of philosophy would therefore be to map out, so to speak, our conceptual schema according to  
their ordinary use, and to eventually correct our misunderstanding of these schema. In that sense, 
ordinary language philosophy is contrasted with “ideal language” philosophy, sometimes said to be 
embodied by the tradition of Frege, Russell, and Carnap. In his 1932 article, Ryle examines the 
harmful role of what he calls “systematically misleading expressions”, which he states have two 
characteristics:
(1) These expressions are perfectly understood by those who make a non-philosophical use of 
them.
(2) However, their grammatical form improperly characterizes the facts that they refer to.     
These expressions are really “misleading” because their improper form does not appear in their 
ordinary use. In addition, this fallacious character is “systematic” because “all expressions of that 
grammatical form [are] misleading in the same way and for the same reason”.63 The role of the 
philosopher is to clarify what is vaguely understood in ordinary communication. Ryle castigates the 
illusory tendency towards abstraction and generalization among metaphysicians that leads them to 
misinterpret statements of ordinary language – for example, to understand the statements “Capone 
is not a philosopher” and “Satan does not exist” in the same way.64 In the same way, Ryle attributes 
the metaphysical debate about universals  to a “category error”.  The metaphysical debate would 
indeed result from the misleading parallelism between statements such as “Jean had given himself 
the prize” and “Virtue is its own reward” – the correct expression of the second statement being: 
“Anyone who is virtuous is benefited thereby”. More generally, ordinary language philosophy, in its 
most radical form, sets about revealing the vanity of certain (or even most) metaphysical debates. 
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What good is  it  to  ask if  the tables exist  per se,  or  if  they are mere aggregates  of elementary 
particles? On a daily basis,  we make paradigmatic  use of  the  word “table” to  refer  to  entities  
possessing a proper existence; therefore, ordinary language teaches us that tables exist. To wonder 
about the existence of the external world, or about mind-body dualism,65 etc., is equally vain: thus, 
metaphysicians quarrel about chimera. However, the classical objection to this type of critique of 
metaphysics appears entirely legitimate: why must the ordinary use of language be the measuring 
stick  of  metaphysical  inquiry?  Why  must  “ordinary  language”,  which  essentially  helps  us  to 
communicate, inform us – better than, for example, rational inquiry – about the ultimate nature of  
reality and the entities that it is composed of? The physicist does not care about knowing if the 
ordinary use of the word “table” corresponds adequately to the nature of this or that aggregate of 
particles that we designate with this word; and neither should the metaphysician worry excessively 
about postulating, for reasons that are not linked to our use of language, autonomous entities such 
as universals.66
The last  position that it  is necessary for us to examine corresponds to what is generally 
called “anti-realism”, and which can take either semantic form or pragmatic form. The term “anti-
realism” indicates  an apparent  confusion among analytics  between the critique of  metaphysical 
realism,  that is  to say,  of the thesis  of the autonomy of the external world, and the critique of 
metaphysics  tout court. We will understand this problem better if we remember that the analytic 
tradition was born from a revolt against idealism (see section 4) and also that metaphysical realism 
widely prevails  today among analytic  philosophers.  Nevertheless,  in  addition  to  these  de  facto 
considerations, it turns out that contemporary anti-realism leads to a devaluation, sometimes very 
violent,  of metaphysics in general.  For example,  Hilary Putnam defends a form of “conceptual 
pluralism” (which he later calls “conceptual relativity”).67 We can summarize this position in the 
following  way:  we  can  speak  a  certain  number  of  different  languages,  such  that  (1)  different 
existential  statements  prove  to  be  true  in  these  languages,  due  to  the  fact  that  ontological 
expressions (equivalent to “there are”, “there exist”, etc.) express different concepts of existence in 
them, and (2) these languages can each describe the facts of the world equally well. Thus, to take 
the example of the problem of  universals  (the question being:  “do the universals,  such as  red, 
modesty, or roundness, exist independently of their instantiations?”), the thesis of nominalism will 
be true in some languages (the statement “universals exist” and its expressions will be false in these 
languages),  and the  thesis  of  the  realism of  universals  –  or  Platonism –  will  be  true  in  other 
languages (the statement “universals  exist” and its expressions will  be true in these languages). 
However, all these different languages describe the world literally as it is. According to the thesis of 
conceptual pluralism, it follows that metaphysical problems are vain or groundless. This conclusion 
is not derived from linguistic criteria, as it is for Carnap, but instead from a pragmatist examination 
of the use of our concepts of existence. For example, Putnam considers the case of two philosophers 
debating about the existence of mereological sums,68 one of them hoping to employ the verb “to 
exist”  in  such a  way that  she is  allowed to  assert  that  mereological  sums exist,  and the  other 
rejecting this use. According to Putnam, these two individuals debate about something important 
when the first  declares that the mereological sums exist,  and the second that they do not exist. 
However, they are not in disagreement, or at least should not be, on the question of knowing if the 
mereological sums really exist. In reality, their disagreement concerns the extension of the use of 
the  concept  of  existence,  and  our  two  metaphysicians  debate  about  the  adoption  or  not  of  a 
particular, optional language. For example, Putnam writes bluntly:
[T]he question [of knowing] whether mereological sums “really exist” is a silly question. It is 
literally a matter of convention whether we decide to say [or not to say] that they exist.69 
Metaphysics is  only  chimaera bombillans in vacuo.  Consequently,  publishing the “obituary” of 
ontology, Putnam concludes, “since it is customary to say at least one good word about the dead”:
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[E]ven if  ontology has  become  a  stinking  corpse,  in  Plato  and Aristotle  it  represented  the  
vehicle for conveying many genuine philosophical insights. These insights still preoccupy all of 
us in philosophy who have any historical sense at all. But the vehicle has long since outlived its  
usefulness.70
Although it seems indisputable that every kind of knowledge contains some element of convention, 
we have no guarantee that what we today call a convention ought not to be one day abandoned, 
perhaps for a reason that we are incapable of anticipating today – this idea fits well with Putnam’s  
fallibilism. Putnam’s fallibilism assigns to philosophy the goal of attaining a set of necessary truths 
while remaining in a  fallibilist  context, rather than giving in to the sirens of scepticism. Yet as 
Claudine Tiercelin emphasizes, it is difficult to simultaneously maintain a preference for common 
sense realism, of pragmatist inspiration, that guarantees us an access to truth – in a minimal way – 
and for fallibilism: we must at  some point stop trying to justify our knowledge. The appeal to 
common sense is moreover in no way incompatible with the patient and systematic elaboration of a  
metaphysics worthy of the name. Charles Sanders Peirce, whose work provides evidence for this, 
suggested founding his realist scientific metaphysics on a critical conception of common sense.71 
 What conclusions can we draw from this brief tour of the horizon and desert landscape that  
it seems to reveal to us on the ancestral lands of metaphysics? “Metaphysics is dead. Long live  
metaphysics!”: this could be the tragicomic conclusion of the pavane for a dead queen, but it is not 
the last word of philosophy. We can undoubtedly admit that all these critiques are full of lessons, 
that their value is not purely polemical and negative, and that, if metaphysics escapes alive, it will  
emerge grown from it. Frédéric Nef warns the reader at the beginning of his study:
One ought to clear up a misunderstanding, encouraged by the mediocrity of certain debates 
about the relation to the past. In no way is this work about restoring the metaphysics of the  
Ancients, nor even of the Moderns, of completely reestablishing the native rights of traditional 
metaphysics. Kant’s critiques concerning general metaphysics disconnected from every relation 
to experience, Nietzsche’s critiques concerning the utilization of certain metaphysical themes,  
diverted  from  their  theoretical  finality,  to  moralist  or  spiritualist  ends,  Carnap’s  critiques,  
perhaps the most radical, when they concern precisely the pseudo-liberation vis-à-vis minimal 
criteria of rationality and not the a priori impossibility of sensible metaphysical statements, are 
perfectly valid.  Metaphysics cannot  turn its  back on experience,  favor an unhealthy cult  of  
things of the soul and of the mind, nor substitute wordplay for analysis and for argument.72
To adopt the cause of metaphysics is not to remain blind to the limits of its mode of knowledge and 
its field of study. But to read all the texts that we have examined, it may seem that the criticisms are  
insurmountable. However, an initial response to this hypothesis must emphasize the irreducibility of 
metaphysics:  “close the door right in  its  face /  through windows it  returns  with ease”,73 as  the 
natural in La Fontaine’s pleasant expression. But without laboriously going on and on about the 
natural speculator of the animal metaphysicum, we will emphasize that it is quite difficult to attempt 
to eliminate metaphysics without (1) accomplishing in this very attempt a metaphysical gesture, and 
(2) implicitly assuming various metaphysical presuppositions that will remain unnoticed, since they 
are  not  explicitly  demonstrated  and  corrected.  Thus,  even  philosophical  currents  that  have 
historically become more or less hostile to metaphysics must be suspicious of the radicality of such 
a dismissal. For the record, let us mention Jean-Luc Marion’s call to prudence:
In the field of thought, the choices do not manifest themselves so simply, between two mutually 
exclusive terms. This would mean falling back once again into a superficial and thoughtless  
polemical treatment of the question of metaphysics, by limiting oneself to such a dichotomy – 
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metaphysics or phenomenology, metaphysics or deconstruction, metaphysics or nihilism, etc.74 
To get at the root of the problem, perhaps we must rid ourselves of what Jocelyn Benoist rightly 
condemns in the name of a “rhetoric of exceeding”.75 The ambiguity of the hackneyed theme of 
exceeding seems to lie in the fact that it simultaneously declares the saturation of a tradition, its  
announced end – the exceeding being dependent on a completion76 – and something like a forced 
march  progress  of  philosophy.77 Hilary  Putnam  aims  right  by  recalling  that  “the  true  task  of 
philosophy  […]  is  not  to  rest  frozen  in  a  gesture  of  repudiation  that  is  as  empty  as  what  it 
repudiates”.78 Moreover, there is often some rejoicing in this gesture, and the death of metaphysics 
does not go without a lugubrious carnival celebrating the loss as a liberation (Derrida, Habermas) or 
as a recovery (Wittgenstein, Ryle, Austin). But it is easy to see that the “event” of “the spirit of the 
century” is built with all the pieces. In this regard, the more the expressions are peremptory – think 
back to the great archetypal phrases about the evidence and the obvious necessity of an exceeding of 
metaphysics  – the  more  the  statement  is  suspect.  If  “a  fine  gentlemanly tone  in  contemporary 
metaphysics”79 exists, assuredly a fine gentlemanly tone for the anti-metaphysical philosopher also 
exists: he who makes himself the prophet of his time or the doctor of an deleterious situation in 
order to scoff at the naïveté of those who still pose traditional questions.
But let us pass over the procedure. Is it necessary to abandon metaphysics to history on the 
grounds  that  it  is  no  longer  compatible  with  our  disenchanted  world  or  our  comprehension of 
language?
Nothing is less sure. For, once more, the greatest difficulty in metaphysics is not to construct a  
metaphysics, nor to proclaim its end, but rather it is to define its true object, the legitimacy of its  
method, the validity or not of its presence next to the other sciences, in short, to determine what  
can, still today, not only explain but also and above all justify what one does with it.80
Claudine Tiercelin’s commentary summarizes the core of the problem very well: metaphysics is a 
living  and  universally  practiced  discipline;  the  responsibility  of  criticism must  not  only  be  to 
examine its very possibility, but the designation and the (de)limitation of its object. Therefore, the 
dilemma concerns the importance that we hope to give to metaphysics, and the epistemological 
foundations of rational inquiry from which it proceeds, rather than its existence strictly speaking. 
Notwithstanding, if we seek a proof of the vitality of metaphysics, it is enough to recall that in the 
most somber hours of logical positivism or of Heideggerian Verwindung, it had its “resistants” – let 
us mention notably, on the analytic side, G. F. Stout, C. D. Broad, H. H. Price, D. C. Williams, and 
C. J. Ducasse, and on the European side, C. Stumpf, R. Ingarden, and N. Hartmann, whose work 
remains invaluable and passionate. Today – and since the 1960s – metaphysics is again flourishing 
and prolix, especially in the “analytic” world.
Let  us  reassure  ourselves:  metaphysics  lives,  and  is  ready to  indefinitely  seek  reprieve 
against those who sentence it to death. It remains for us to consider, in all fairness, what has become 
of this discipline that has miraculously survived.
2. What (nowadays) is metaphysics?
Frédéric  Nef’s work – cited above – responds to  this  difficult  question in  depth and in 
detail.81 Without aspiring to the same degree of precision and erudition, we can make some general 
remarks  on  this  far-reaching  subject  of  inquiry.  The  most  striking  aspect  of  contemporary 
metaphysics – or at least of the work that unfolds in this field of philosophical investigation – is no 
doubt  that  it  appears  in  quite  varied  forms.  If  it  is  rather  difficult  to  find  a  consensus  on  the  
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definition of metaphysics, it is no surprise that the very term was born under the sign of a constant 
ambiguity. We know that the word “metaphysics” comes from the Latin metaphysica, itself coined 
belatedly, according to the heading given in the first century BCE by the late scholarch, Andronicus 
of Rhodes, to books that come after the  Physics in his edition of Aristotle’s works: “ta meta ta  
phusika”,  literally  “the  books  that  come  after  those  that  treat  physical  things”.82 Thereafter, 
philological derivations give the meaning “beyond physics” to the term “metaphysics” – completely 
incompatible with the classical Greek. Is metaphysics a study of entities, physical or not, that exist  
from the mere fact that they are – the study of being qua being, or only beings as they are – or is it 
strictly speaking a transphysics, a discipline that devotes itself to what is beyond the sensible? This 
ambivalence, which it would be too simplistic to reduce to a disagreement between Aristotle and 
Plato,  traverses  the  entire  history of  metaphysics  up  to  the  present.  The  Latin  “ontologia”  (or 
“ontosophia”) emerges from a relatively recent neologism, the first recorded occurrences of which 
date from 1606-1613, and its meaning is not always clearly defined by contemporary authors. This 
is why, without going deeper into this history that fuels an extensive literature, we must proceed to 
the demanding exercise of clarifying, as much as possible, the working contemporary definitions of 
metaphysics and ontology.
Let us note straightaway that the inter-definition of metaphysics and ontology is itself  a 
source  of  ambiguity  –  without  even  mentioning  the  further  complications  caused  by frequent 
instances when the two terms are indifferently used. Attempting to untangle the inextricable knot, 
Achille  C.  Varzi83 points  out  two  coherent  ways  of  approaching  the  question,  in  both  cases 
subscribing to the primacy of ontology over metaphysics:
(1) (a) Ontology consists in saying that which is [quid], i.e., by taking stock of the furniture of 
the world.
(b) Metaphysics consists in saying that which it is [quod], i.e., in determining the nature or 
essence of entities that we have first established the existence of.
(2) (a) Ontology is occupied with the totality of that which is possible.
(b) Metaphysics is occupied with the totality of that which is actual.
According to the first proposition (1), prevailing among analytic metaphysicians, ontology 
seeks to establish an exhaustive classification of the types of entities that exist. Therefore, it consists 
in posing questions of the type: do relations, properties, substances, material objects, universals, 
individuals, numbers, events, classes, mereological sums, contradictory objects, a Prime Mover, etc. 
exist? Must we include, for example, tables, family reunions, and courage in our assessment of the 
world, or quite simply arrangements of elementary particles that in such a material configuration 
form what we call “tables”, or that in this circumstance or from this to that moment form what we 
call “family reunions”, or in another circumstance form what what we call “courageous persons” 
(without  tables,  family  reunions,  and  courage  having  any  existence  in  themselves  except  as 
concepts)? Always according to the pair of definitions (1), metaphysics, in contrast, must establish 
what are these things that are. Metaphysics poses questions such as: what are the conditions of 
identity and persistence through time of material objects? What are their essential properties? What 
is the nature of universals, of time, etc.?
The second proposition (2) at the beginning corresponds to a more marginal position that has 
its roots in Alexius Meinong, but is explicitly expressed by Roman Ingarden84 and picked up by 
Bergmann, Johansson, Grossmann, and Chisholm. According to this pair of definitions, the role of 
ontology is to determine, independently of what really exists, all the kinds of possible entities – or, 
as Ingarden says, the possible “modes of existence” of beings. Indeed, one can make ontological 
decisions  only  in  the  most  general  and  most  neutral  possible  framework,  by  studying  all  the 
available “alternatives”. According to the pair of definitions (1), ontology proceeds “blindly” and 
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“piece by piece”85 (postulating that one type of entity exists and not another before saying what it  
is). The risk of this method is that it allows the metaphysician to trust in “intuitions”, which hardly 
have material credibility – the fact that one can be convinced of the existence of abstract objects is 
not a valid argument in favor of their concrete existence. In addition, the proposed inventory has 
every chance of being lacunary. On the other hand, the pair of definitions (2) assign a much larger 
field of investigation to ontology, in order to then be entirely free, in the framework of metaphysical  
inquiry, to determine which types of possible entities really exist.
Therefore,  there  are  two very different  ways  of  asserting  the  primacy of  ontology over 
metaphysics, according to the definition that we gave of these two terms. Let us come back for a 
moment to the first proposition, which, to repeat, is the prevailing position. One of the clearest and 
most adequate definitions of ontology (1a), though not the most original, is Barry Smith’s:
Ontology as a branch of philosophy is the science of what is, of the kinds and structures of  
objects, properties, events, processes, and relations in every area of reality. […] Ontology seeks 
to provide a definitive and exhaustive classification of entities in all  spheres of being.  The 
classification should be definitive in the sense that it can serve as an answer to such questions  
as: What classes of entities are needed for a complete description and explanation of all the 
goings-on in the universe? Or: What classes of entities are needed to give an account of what  
makes true all truths? It should be exhaustive in the sense that all types of entities should be 
included in the classification, including also the types of relations by which entities are tied 
together to form larger wholes.86 
When Smith speaks about exhaustive inventory, of course, one must not conclude that ontology is 
occupied with drawing up a complete list of all the particular entities of our world, but rather that it 
categorizes the types of entities that we can include in the catalog of being. The role of metaphysics 
is then to precisely formulate the conditions of existence of these types: for example, if events exist, 
then we will ask under what conditions an event exists, what is its mode of occurrence, its mode of 
persistence through time, its relations with material objects, etc. In a similar way, in the  Logical  
Investigations, Husserl distinguishes formal ontology from material ontology: formal ontology is 
occupied with beings in general, while material ontology is occupied with features and specific 
sectors of reality (in the way that today we talk about the ontology of mathematics, ontology of 
physics, social ontology, etc.).87 One could object – and a certain number of naturalist philosophers 
do not  hesitate  to  do so  – that  the  inventory of  the  world,  which  ontology is  supposed to  be 
responsible for, is the domain allotted to science, and notably to theoretical physics: it  is in the 
hands of science to pronounce judgments on the existence of elementary particles (or fields), on the 
nature of visual perception, on the existence of the void, etc. However, we can provide at least three 
good reasons why ontology is not reducible to the natural sciences:88
(1) Ontology does not only pronounce judgments on the existence of material things studied by 
physics,  but  also  on  the  existence  of  immaterial entities  (spirit,  numbers,  propositions, 
events, universals, etc.).
(2) Physics certainly studies the elementary “bricks” of reality, but nothing tells us that reality is 
uniquely constituted by these minimal elements, nor that, to take up this classical example 
once more, tables are not something more than particles of which they are composed. In 
addition, if physics studies the “bricks” of the world, metaphysics in the same way studies 
the “cement” of things, to take up Emile Meyerson’s expression – especially necessary, non-
physical relations (supervenience, emergence, existential dependence, compresence, etc.). 
(3) Finally,  even reducing the totality of reality to  physical  interactions  does  not  mean that 
physics  can  avoid  implicit  ontological  commitments  that  ontology  must  reveal;  this  is 
precisely Quine’s important contribution to this question.
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Let  us  add  that  Claudine  Tiercelin,  picking  up  Kevin  Mulligan’s  analysis,  coherently 
synthesizes these different definitions of ontology by joining them to a meta-ontological component 
that we have not yet tackled:
Ontology responds to four major kinds of questions: (1) ontology can be understood as the 
study of our ontological engagements, that is to say, of what we are committed to; (2) ontology 
can be understood very widely as the study of what there is, or, more precisely, (3) as the study 
of the most general characteristics of what is and of the most general way in which the things  
that  are are  related to  each other;  (4)  finally,  ontology can concentrate on the (most  meta-
ontological) task of saying what ontology should accomplish, or even how it must understand 
the question that it is supposed to respond to and with what methodology.89
Therefore,  ontology  thus  understood  has  a  largely  taxonomical  role,  elaborating  an 
arborescent hierarchy of types of entities, which explains the renaissance of a categorical approach 
to metaphysics within analytic philosophy. Let us mention, for example, without entering into the 
details of its choices and implications, Roderick Chisholm’s (1996) hierarchy:
Entia
Contingent Necessary
States Individuals States Nonstates
Events Boundaries Substances Attributes Substance
In principle, all the entities of reality should be capable of being subsumed under one of these 
categories and should correspond to a single branch of the tree – each branch being almost infinitely 
extendable through more and more subtle distinctions, until the list is exhaustive. Let us note that 
this type of taxonomical approach to ontology was already developed in the seventeenth century 
when the term emerged.
However, we have not exhausted – far from it – the possible definitions of metaphysics and 
ontology.  In  particular,  we have  neglected  a  fundamental  distinction,  since  Wolff  (Philosophia 
prima  sive  Ontologia,  1729)  and  Kant,  between  general  metaphysics and  special  metaphysics. 
General metaphysics is strictly identified with ontology, that is to say, according to Wolff’s terms, 
with “the part of philosophy that is occupied with being in general”. According to this definition, 
ontology responds simultaneously to the question “what there is?” and “what it is?”, since it is 
occupied with extracting the most universal features of reality. Special metaphysics, on the other 
hand, includes three disciplines: rational theology, whose object is God, rational cosmology, whose 
object  is  the  world,  and rational  psychology,  whose  object  is  the  soul.  The  objects  of  special  
metaphysics  are  always  studied  in  some  way,  but  the  cohesiveness  of  its  practice  has  been 
fragmented.  Today the  task  of  rational  theology  is  found  in  natural  theology,  which  is  partly 
connected to ontology, and continues to ask traditional questions about the existence and nature of 
God. Rational psychology more or less corresponds to contemporary philosophy of mind, which is 
adjacent to the neurosciences and cognitive sciences on the one hand, and to ontology on the other. 
On the other hand, the inquiry of rational cosmology is nowadays largely taken up by astrophysics.  
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We can nevertheless propose to update the definition of special metaphysics by including in its 
fields  of  study,  for  example,  the  problems of  philosophy of  mind,  those  of  free  will,  those of 
philosophy of action, those of natural theology, and those of perception.
Let  us  mention  a  final  contemporary  distinction  between  descriptive  metaphysics  and 
prescriptive  or  revisionist  metaphysics  (sometimes  called  “reformist”  metaphysics).  The  first, 
illustrated principally by P. F. Strawson,90 is situated in the Kantian lineage, and limits the activity of 
metaphysics to describing our conceptual schema, our cognitive system. Prescriptive metaphysics, 
on  the  other  hand,  is  devoted  to  determining  the  fundamental  categories  in  which  reality  is 
articulated independently of our image of it or our use of language, in order to consequently revise 
our conceptual schema if they are insufficient. It is clear that the widely prevailing prescriptive 
conception of metaphysics goes hand in hand with a realist commitment to our knowledge of the 
external  world,  whereas  the  descriptive  conception  tends  towards  maintaining  a  form of  neo-
Kantian anti-realism.
Are these different definitions valid outside of the framework of analytic metaphysics? The 
question of the divide between analytics and non-analytics, which we will have the occasion to 
return to in detail, is particularly perceptible in the field of metaphysics. Does it make sense to talk  
about “continental metaphysics” as we talk about analytic metaphysics? It is thoroughly debatable, 
inasmuch as it seems difficult to define the cohesiveness of non-analytic metaphysics, if we exclude 
general  methodological and historical considerations that would also be applied to non-analytic 
philosophy as a whole. However, a forthcoming work explicitly announces its ambition “to sketch 
out a continental metaphysics that is not in contradiction with philosophies of immanence”91 – here 
we  can  see  a  somewhat  indecisive  attempt  to  negatively  outline,  relative  to  the  comparative 
methodological  and  conceptual  coherence  of  analytic  metaphysics,  the  cohesiveness  of  a 
specifically continental metaphysics.92
The first  remark that  we can make on this  subject  is  to  sketch out  three approaches  of 
“metaphysics” in non-analytic territory. The first is essentially historical, or historico-hermeneutic 
(practicing  the  exegesis  of  the  grand  texts  of  Western  metaphysics),  and  rarely  displays  a 
“constructive” (in the neutral sense of the term) ambition towards contemporary philosophy. The 
question is not so much whether this thesis of Avicenna is more adequate or better argued than that 
antagonistic thesis of Averroes, than it is a question of attempting to assess the difference between 
these two theses, their influences and their descendants, often in an holistic perspective. The second 
approach is  critical. It principally inherits from major figures of European philosophy, including 
Kant, Nietzsche, and Heidegger, who present metaphysics as having a negative side and a positive 
side.  Accordingly,  this  type  of  approach  towards  metaphysics  is,  in  reality,  essentially  meta-
metaphysical. It concerns wondering about the conditions of possibility of metaphysical knowledge, 
about the illusion of the knowledge of the supersensible, about erring in the reduction of being to 
beings, and even about historical, ideological, and social determinations at work in metaphysical 
doctrines.  Finally,  the  last  approach  is  specifically  constructive,  in  the  sense  that  it  intends  to 
positively describe the underlying structure of reality by rejecting the aforementioned critiques of 
metaphysics. Frequently, these three approaches are difficult to clearly discern from each other, and 
not solely because of a misunderstanding on the part of the philosophers in question, but above all  
because of the contingent impossibility of excluding the history of metaphysics and its limits when 
doing metaphysics today.
We can  also  approach  the  problem of  the  cohesiveness  of  non-analytic  metaphysics  by 
enumerating  a  certain  number  of  philosophical  currents  that  reserve  a  special  seat  for  first 
philosophy: for example, process philosophy, idealism, phenomenology and its numerous branches, 
as  well  as  diverse “neo-” currents  such as  neo-Thomism, neo-Kantianism,  neo-Platonism,  neo-
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Aristotelianism, etc.
Let  us  stop  to  consider  for  a  moment  the  emblematic  case  of  phenomenology.  Two 
foundational texts from this tradition clearly maintain the narrowness of its relation to ontology. For 
instance, from this long passage from Husserl’s Cartesian Meditations §64:
We can now say likewise that, in a priori transcendental phenomenology, all a priori sciences 
without exception originate with an ultimate grounding, thanks to its correlational research, and 
that, taken with this origin, they belong within an all-embracing a priori phenomenology itself, 
as  its  systematically  differentiated  branches. This  system of  the  all-embracing  a  priori  is 
therefore to be designated also as the systematic unfolding of the all-embracing a priori innate 
in  the  essence  of  a  transcendental  subjectivity  (and  consequently in  that  of  transcendental 
intersubjectivity)  – or as the systematic unfolding of the  universal logos of all conceivable  
being.  In other words: as developed systematically and fully,  transcendental phenomenology 
would be  ipso facto the true and genuine universal ontology – not, however, just an emptily 
formal  universal  ontology,  but  also  one  that  comprised  in  itself  all  regional  existential  
possibilities, and did so in respect of all the correlations pertaining to them. [...]
Finally,  lest  any  misunderstanding  arise,  I  would  point  out  that,  as  already  stated,  
phenomenology indeed  excludes every naïve metaphysics  that operates with  absurd things in 
themselves,  but  does not  exclude metaphysics as such.  It  does no violence to the problem-
motives  that  inwardly drive the old tradition into the wrong line of  inquiry and the wrong 
method; and it by no means professes to stop short of the ‘supreme and ultimate’ questions.
A quite  remarkable  text,  in  which  Husserl  assigns  the  role  of  true  ontology  (as  opposed  to 
traditional ontology) to phenomenology; far from exceeding metaphysics, the phenomenological 
breakthrough fundamentally renews it, and again gives it a central role.93 Let us also consider the 
close of the famous §7 from Being and Time:
Ontology and phenomenology are not two different disciplines which among others belong to 
philosophy. Both terms characterize philosophy itself, its object and procedure. Philosophy is 
universal  phenomenological  ontology,  taking its  departure  from the hermeneutic  of  Dasein, 
which, as analytic of existence, has fastened the end of the guideline of all philosophical inquiry 
at the point from which it arises and to which it returns. 
For  Heidegger  at  the  end  of  the  1920s,  the  ambiguous  proximity  between  metaphysics  and 
phenomenology  takes  the  form  of  the  existential  analytic  of  Dasein. Just  as  for  Husserl, 
metaphysics  renewed  by  phenomenology  aspires  to  a  foundational  and  propaedeutic  role  that 
determines  the  development  of  every  philosophy,  and  even  of  every  science.  Even  today,  a 
philosopher like Jean-Luc Marion attempts to reaffirm the identity of phenomenology with first 
philosophy,  motivated  by  the  ideal  of  a  new  philosophia  perennis.  The  relationship  between 
phenomenology and metaphysics, however, contains a paradox, as Jocelyn Benoist writes:
In a curious exchange of properties, sometimes [phenomenology] has been able to assume the 
appearance of condemned metaphysics, sometimes that of metaphysics sought after in the eyes 
of what we now learn to see as its twin sister: analytic philosophy.94
The case of Heidegger, beyond his work’s critical aspect that we have already examined, 
would nevertheless merit separate treatment. In the last analysis, it is for Heidegger, rather than for 
Husserl, that ontology takes a “subjectivist” turn, if we do not designate by this term “idealism” 
strictly  speaking  –  since  idealism  is  already  and  above  all  at  the  heart  of  the  Husserlian 
transcendental turn. Ontology understood as hermeneutic of Dasein is subjectivist in the sense that 
it consecrates a “humanist” and idiosyncratic approach to existence that emphasizes certain extra-
ontological  aspects,  according  to  classical  criteria,  of  being-in-the-world  –  beginning  with  the 
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thematization of “care” (Sorge) and “anxiety” (Angst) at the heart of the question of being. Human 
being is again placed at the center of this reformed ontology, for, among beings, human being alone 
opens onto the question of being, i.e., of its being. Human being is the animal who asks itself why it 
is in the world, who questions its existence, and, so to speak, the incongruity of its pure presence. In 
addition, human being is the one who becomes frightened by its pure presence. It is therefore a 
meditation on  human being,  and not on God, the Big Bang,  or the Prime Mover,  which gives 
meaning to Leibniz’s question: “why is there something rather than nothing?” Therefore, ontology 
thus understood has little in common with the previous definitions that we have summarized.95
Some  non-analytic  philosophers  have  also  defended  more  traditional  definitions  of 
metaphysics.  For  example,  the  Latvian  philosopher  Nicolai  Hartmann  has  developed  a  quite 
interesting stratified ontology of “levels of reality”. Predominant in his work is the inner conviction 
that it is impossible to reduce the entities of the world, and thus reflection on that which is, to a 
common denominator. Each level of reality – physico-mathematical, organic, psychic, and spiritual 
– is a different field of ontological investigation that delivers to us one aspect among others of the  
variegation of being.
After  the  glorious  moments  of  philosophies  of  life,  mind,  or  immanence,  over  the  past 
twenty  years  we  have  witnessed  in  “continental”  territory  the  renaissance  of  a  non-
phenomenological speculative and systematic metaphysics, seeking to take on a foundational role 
and rely on a quest for an irrefutable knowledge.96 This type of metaphysical practice has diverse 
influences,  but  we  can  mention  among  its  main  characteristics  a  pronounced  taste  for 
demonstration, coinciding with the refusal of a “poetic” deviation from ontology, a reluctance to 
engage with the historicization of metaphysics, as well as a marked preference for the most original 
(and at times the most counter-intuitive) theses. We should add that this conception of metaphysics 
is often very ambitious, and aspires to be included in speculative philosophy’s lineage, by taking on 
the highest degree of abstraction while at the same time privileging a worldview of the primary 
features of reality over a detailed study, for example, of the types of entities that exist.
In  the  margins  of  idealism,  phenomenology,  hermeneutics,  and  the  new  speculative 
metaphysics,  can  we  delimit  other  non-analytic  conceptions  of  metaphysics?  We  should  here 
address  the  thorny  and  complicated  question  of  “postmodernism”,  and  even  of  what  certain 
magazines call “pop philosophy”. Without lingering too much on the debate concerning the lack of 
clarity of these names, let us remark that it seems difficult to find something like a definition or a  
postmodern practice of metaphysics, except to say that we no longer know what we truly mean by 
this term. For example, we frequently bring together the substantive “metaphysics” or the adjective 
“metaphysical”  with  studies  having  to  do  with  psychoanalysis  (above  all  Lacanian),  politics, 
sociology, or anthropology. Moreover, postmodernism is often the new name for “deconstructionist” 
critiques of metaphysics. But how would we then qualify the position of a Slavoj Žižek against the 
postmodern critique of metaphysics?97 On this subject, one might surmise that the taste for irony, 
subversion, and brilliant synthesis often prevails over the rigor of thought (at least metaphysical 
thought).
Before examining in greater detail the question of the renewal of metaphysics in the analytic 
tradition, let us again quote Claudine Tiercelin, who gives an account of the diversity of possible 
approaches towards metaphysics, which we have briefly examined:
Let us depart  from the strong Avicennian and Scotist  idea:  the autonomy of metaphysics is 
guaranteed by the acknowledgment of the fact that being is the most known principle. But if it 
is, this is as its fundamental indetermination. Can we understand fully the irreducibility, or even 
the scientificity of metaphysics in terms of this indetermination? The entire difficulty of a well-
conducted metaphysical project comes […] from there: if we want to bring it to fruition, we 
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must get out of being in its indetermination and say something about being. How can we both 
avoid the unspeakable, the inexpressible without reducing being? […] It is this challenge that 
Aristotle  ceaselessly  risked  and  which,  in  a  word,  he  succeeded  in  clinging  to.  […]  But 
metaphysics  has  shown  that  we  can  retain  some  of  Aristotle’s  lessons  without  becoming 
Aristotelian. […] We can envisage a metaphysics that puts the most emphasis no longer on 
substance, but on relation, or on quality, or on event, or even on properties, states of things,  
abstract propositions, possible worlds […], relations in intension, individual essences […], and 
even situations.98
3. The Ontological Turn
“However [much, during the period of logical positivism,] analytic philosophy […] was an 
anti-metaphysical movement,” Putnam writes, “it has recently become the most pro-metaphysical 
movement on the world philosophical scene.”99 This reversal is certainly spectacular. It can even 
seem unnatural when we ignore the details of the history of analytic philosophy (see section 4). 
Taking  the  retrospective  opposing  view  to  the  famous  “linguistic  turn”  whose  label  and 
accompanying prejudices still stick to the skin of analytic philosophers, John Heil and C. B. Martin 
published an article in 1999 entitled “The Ontological Turn”.100 They take note of the incomparable 
renewal  of realist  ontology,  and condemn under the name of  “linguisticism” the polymorphous 
thesis according to which we can only access reality by means of language:
Linguisticism  does  not  succeed  in  replacing  or  eliminating  ontology,  but  only  diverting 
attention and postponing the hard questions. The mistake is to imagine that it is philosophically 
innocent.101 
Whether the most radical defenders of semantic analysis like it or not, ontology is not only possible, 
but  also  inevitable  and necessary.  Meyerson  wrote  that  “man practices  metaphysics  just  as  he 
breathes”, for as M. Jourdain, we practice ontology without knowing it. But this does not mean that  
all ontological postulates have the same value, nor that philosophers are in a better position than 
dentists or stockbrokers to decide between these postulates. The omnipresence of ontology must not 
be postulated at the cost of a relativist devaluation of ontological truth. In  From an Ontological  
Point of View,102 John Heil therefore emphasizes the fact that a good ontology requires seriousness – 
understanding the idea of “ontological seriousness” as both difficult to obtain and at the same time 
as a cardinal virtue of the metaphysician. We can summarize this necessity for seriousness in the 
following manner: first, it is necessary to constantly be careful not to arbitrarily postulate a type of 
relation or entity that we think we need or that we have intuitions about; then, it is necessary to 
permanently unravel the chain of implicit ontological implications of our reasoning, in any domain 
of philosophy, so as to verify its coherence and appropriateness; finally, it is necessary to abstain 
from explanations involving undefined ontological entities. Heil details the benefits of ontological 
seriousness for philosophy of mind, and the danger produced through negligence or indifference in 
this domain. In particular, he devotes himself to the example of the relation of supervenience in the 
functionalist  theories  of  mind  that  postulate  that  mental  qualities  “supervene”  on  the  physical 
(neuronal) substratum of individuals. This recourse to the relation of supervenience, as Heil shows, 
is ontologically imprecise. A property of higher level A supervenes on a lower property B, if A 
depends  on  B,  and if  A covaries  with  B.  According to  him,  we can  formulate  the  relation  of 
supervenience in the following way: “if a thing  x has A at the higher level  α, then there exists a 
property B at the lower level β, and if x has B, then x necessarily has A”. But this statement could 
be true (1) if α is identical to β, (2) if α is entirely made of β, (3) if α is caused by β, (4) if α and β  
have a common cause.  However,  as Heil  notes,  none of these relations correspond to what we 
vaguely  understand  by  “supervenience”.103 This  example  clearly  shows  the  importance  of  a 
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meticulous  examination  of  ontological  implications  that  are  integrated  into  each  domain  of 
philosophy and often remain unnoticed.
The return to grace of metaphysics and ontology is more recently accompanied by a novel 
development in the reflection on meta-ontological and meta-metaphysical order. The appearance in 
2009 of a collection soberly entitled Metametaphysics104 attests to the vitality of this discussion. We 
have already evoked a certain number of questions of meta-metaphysical order: on what conditions 
is metaphysics possible? What is the nature of metaphysical knowledge? What are the respective 
objects of metaphysics and of ontology? What method to adopt in order to describe the world? Etc. 
Of course, this type of discussion also opens up metaphysics to critique, by raising the following 
question: are metaphysical debates vain or groundless? At least  three types of deflationism still  
threaten metaphysics today, mostly in the analytic world:
(1) Strong deflationism: metaphysical debates are empty and purely verbal.
(2) Moderate deflationism: there are genuine metaphysical debates, but they can be resolved in 
a relatively trivial way through a consideration of conceptual or semantic facts.
(3) Scepticism: metaphysical debates are legitimate, but it will never be possible to settle the 
argument with certainty, in favor of a particular point of view on each subject; in this sense 
metaphysics formulates questions and hypotheses, but produces no response. 
Points of view (1) and (2) are inherited from the critiques that we have examined in section 1. Point 
of view (3), on the other hand, is unique in that it is maintained even by some metaphysicians. This 
point of view does not undermine their interest in their discipline, but renders obsolete a strong 
version  of  metaphysical  progress  analogous  to  scientific  progress.  These  remarks  raise  crucial 
questions about the conditions of possibility for metaphysics and ontology. Christopher Peacocke 
has  especially drawn attention  to  the  necessity of  responding to  what  he calls  the  “integration 
challenge”.105 The integration challenge can be summarized in the following manner: “We have to 
reconcile a plausible account of what is involved in the truth of statements of a given kind with a 
credible account of how we can know those statements, when we do know them.”106 In other words, 
metaphysical inquiry should be accompanied by an epistemological inquiry that justifies the form of 
knowledge of the former. It is necessary, in every domain of philosophy, to unify metaphysics with 
epistemology in order to give correct justifications for the truth of our knowledge.
The other consequence of the resurgence of metaphysics in an analytic framework is the 
multiplication of great “debates” and “themes” that have become in some way standards that every 
metaphysician must confront. A non-exhaustive list of such themes should include:
• The new problem of universals: Do universals exists? Do tropes (abstract particulars) exist?
• The  ontology  of  properties:  are  properties  qualitative  (attributing  a  real  property,  e.g., 
redness) or dispositional (power to produce a certain effect, e.g., weakness) or both at the 
same time?
• Modality: do possible worlds really exist or are they simply modal tools for understanding 
counterfactual statements? Is essence distinct from necessity?
• Causality: does causation exist? Are there free actions?
• The  problem of  material  composition:  are  there  tables  or  only certain  arrangements  of 
elementary particles that form what we call tables?
• The problem of co-location: is the sculpture entirely identical to the block of bronze it is  
made of?
• Social  ontology:  what  is  the  ontological  status  of  conventional  entities  such  as  banks, 
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families, states, etc.?
• The problems of time: do the past and the future exist? Do objects have temporal parts? 
Does our identity persist over time?
• The problems of vagueness: are there vague objects in reality?
• Mind: are mental states reducible to a physical substratum?
Within each of these debates and in many others still, analytic metaphysicians tend to systematically 
elaborate a taxonomy of all the positions judged if not possible, at least reasonable, by most often 
labeling them, if you will, by “-ism” neologisms. This method has the advantage of establishing a 
kind of cartography of the primary metaphysical positions concerning the primary problems, and of 
allowing each of the interlocutors to locate the point of view of the other in the correct dialectical  
space. Accordingly,  the discussions do not take the form of  ad hominem attacks, but rather are 
consistent with the more general framework of the struggle between several antagonistic theories on 
the  same  question  –  according  to  the  model  of  the  natural  sciences.  However,  this  way  of 
proceeding does not come without its disadvantages: to be original at all costs, some philosophers 
write articles maintaining the most improbable combinations of positions (often, too, with great 
technical ability).107 One can see here one of the current vices of the law of “publish or perish”, 
which tends to  impose itself  throughout the world,  but  also the counterpart  to the taxonomical 
obsession  of  analytic  metaphysics  that  seems  to  favor  the  development  of  a  “multiple-choice” 
ontology. Ontology can then take on an alluring arrangement on the basis of established taxonomy, 
and provide material for articles of the type: “can we maintain a position x about a problem A and a 
position y about a problem B?” Nevertheless, for the most part analytic metaphysicians grant major 
importance to the coherence of their commitments.
4. Subsidiary Remarks on the “Great Schism”108
In the preceding sections, we’ve briefly mentioned the divide of contemporary philosophy 
between “analytics” and “continentals”. It is time to make a further detour along this fault line and 
explore its historical relevance. Let us first note that the common use of the antagonistic expressions 
“continental philosophy” and “analytic philosophy” is a recent development. In fact, it emerges at 
the end of the 1950s, in particular at the 1958 Cérisy-la-Salle conference that enabled the meeting in 
France between distinguished philosophers coming from the two traditions: Ryle, Strawson, Quine, 
and Austin, on the one side, and Alquié, Merleau-Ponty, Wahl, and Van Breda, on the other. In his  
opening address,  Jean Wahl differentiates  three prevailing  currents  in  the world of  philosophy: 
dialectical materialism (Marxism), analytic philosophy (according to him, coinciding with “neo-
positivism and  logical  positivism”),  and  continental  philosophy (“in  diverse  forms”,  including 
phenomenology  and  existentialism).  This  colloquium,  whose  lectures  and discussions  were 
transcribed and published in 1962, is fascinating in many respects.109 The participants each made the 
effort to understand the point of view of the other, and even to minimize the difference. Jean Wahl 
seemed convinced of this unrecognized affinity:
There are problems...philosophical problems...I believe real problems. But in fact we are much 
closer than many of us here think.
As for the “analytics”, they object to the prejudices of the linguistic turn: Austin goes so far as to  
say that “the expression does not represent much in my eyes”, but “as much this slogan as another”.  
However,  the  event  is  especially  interesting  because  each  discussion  reveals  that  in  fact  the 
encounter is  missed. When Merleau-Ponty, with a lot of good will, asks whether Ryle’s project is 
not much closer to phenomenology than he wants to admit, the Oxford philosopher responds in the 
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negative. But it is above all the genuine dialogue of the deaf between Father Van Breda (founder of 
the Husserl archives in Leuven) and P. F. Strawson that draws our attention. Each of them sketches 
out their own point of view and does not succeed in grasping the perspective of the other, despite 
Jean Wahl’s several and somewhat desperate attempts to suggest again that “perhaps the agreement 
is deeper than it appears at first sight”! It is certainly true that the discussion then gets out of hand  
between  the  analytics  themselves  (Strawson,  Ayer,  and Ryle).  Nevertheless,  the  Cérisy-la-Salle 
conference, despite its objective of opening discussion, determined for a long time the terms of the 
divide between “analytics” and “continentals”.
Let us return for a moment to the history of the schism. Numerous studies on the preliminary 
symptoms of analytic philosophy have shown, over the past few years, what is unnatural about the 
schism.  It’s  not  that  the  current  state  of  the  analytic-continental  divide  corresponds  to  real 
differences, but that these differences are not for the most part directly tributaries of the source of 
the  analytic  current.  If  we  must  seek  the  true  origin  of  the  radical  divergence  between  two 
conceptions of philosophy – the one in love with systems, absolutes, and a historico-political or 
humanist  view  of  knowledge,  the  other  preferring  logical  analysis,  argumentative  clarity,  and 
metaphysical realism – we should turn towards the German-Austrian border, and not the English 
Channel or the Atlantic. The radical critique of Kantianism by the Austrian philosopher Bernard 
Bolzano is  in  fact  the  point  of  departure  of  a  profound rupture  between,  on the  one  side,  the 
specifically German philosophy embodied by Fichte, Hegel, Husserl, Heidegger, Adorno, etc., and, 
on the other side, the Austrian tradition founded by Bolzano, and continued essentially by Franz 
Brentano and his students – Meinong, Husserl, Ehrenfels, Marty, Twardowski – and beyond by their 
own  students.  For  instance,  Michael  Dummett’s  seminal  work110 has  shown  that  the  habit  of 
considering  analytic  philosophy  as  a  whole  as  “Anglo-American”  was  born  from  a  “serious 
historical  distortion”.  Rather,  if  we  take  into  consideration  the  context  of  the  development  of 
analytic philosophy, we will be persuaded to call it “Anglo-Austrian”. This acknowledgment of the 
Austrian way and Brentano’s influence also shows that to systematically oppose phenomenology 
and analytic ontology (or ontology  tout court) amounts, as we have seen, to arbitrarily ignoring 
Husserl’s work undertaken before the turn of transcendental idealism (specifically in the  Logical  
Investigations), but also the work of realist phenomenologists who claimed to follow his teaching, 
such as  Johannes  Daubert,111 Adolf  Reinach,112 Max Scheler,  and above all  Roman Ingarden,113 
whose  contributions  to  contemporary  metaphysics  are  major,  and  whose  works  are  almost 
exclusively discussed by analytic philosophers. As Kevin Mulligan writes:
One  of  the  numerous  ironies  of  the  history of  philosophy of  the  century is  that  ontology 
flourished at its beginning, outside of the newborn analytic philosophy, in the philosophies of  
Brentano, Husserl, Reinach, and Meinong.114
In addition to the phenomenologists (and Meinong, who we will study more fully in the following 
section), we find among Brentano’s students the Polish philosopher Kazimierz Twardowski who 
founded the very prolific  Lwów-Warsaw school, initiating what is commonly called “the golden 
age” of  Polish philosophy.  This  school  was closely associated with pioneering studies  on non-
standard  logic  and  a  genuine  metaphysical  orientation,  thanks  to  figures  such  as  Łukasiewicz, 
Leśniewski,  Kotarbiński,  Ajdukiewicz,  and  Tarski.  In  Austria  itself,  the  Graz  school  continued 
Brentano’s teachings in several directions, by developing in particular a new psychology spurred by 
Christian von Ehrenfels, founder of Gestalttheorie, and the theory of the object with – in addition to 
Meinong  himself  –  Stephan  Witasek  and  Vittorio  Benussi.  Among  Brentano’s  other  important 
disciples, we can mention Anton Marty, whose work concerns psychology as well as ontology, and 
Carl Stumpf, the dedicatee of the Logical Investigations.
All  of  these  philosophers  demonstrated  that  the  demand for  clarity,  rigor,  and technical 
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competence (especially the mastery of formal languages), along with attention to the methods and 
development of the natural sciences, and a realist conception of truth as well as a clear taste for 
argumentative discussion (which goes hand in hand with the acceptance of a certain “anonymity” of 
philosophy),  involve  neither  sterile  reductionism  nor  archaic  naïveté,115 and  are  in  no  way 
incompatible with a keen interest in “human” approaches – or, in short, intentional approaches – 
towards the metaphysics that we find in psychology, phenomenology, or even in diverse forms of 
idealism. Let us consider Tadeusz Kotarbiński’s almost heroic definition of the philosopher: 
A philosopher is a thinker who strives for precision in formulating problems, defining concepts,  
formulating  theorems  and systems  of  theorems.  He  does  so  principally by his  inner  effort 
intended to ensure a better understanding of thoughts of people groping in the dark, to formulate 
problems in a more rational way, to achieve complete clarity of concepts, usually obscure, and 
to obtain self-evident theorems and sound systems. He struggles against vagueness, obscurity,  
indefiniteness, and confusion of thought, and combats forms of inebriated thinking which is 
often a result of succumbing to stubborn superstition, to sentimental illusion, or to partiality due  
to the personal or social position of the thinker.116 
After these brief remarks, it should be clear that the analytic current has never had a monopoly on 
rigorous methodology inspired by the natural sciences, nor, of course, a monopoly on metaphysical 
investigation.  Why, then,  does its supposedly positivist  and scientistic orientation result  in anti-
metaphysical conclusions? We have already suggested that these allegations rest essentially on the 
memory of the Vienna Circle episode. The analytic current was born from Russell and Moore’s 
“rebellion” against neo-Hegelian idealism of the British philosopher Francis Herbert Bradley, and 
against  the  influence  of  idealism  in  general  in  England  during  this  time  (also  embodied  by 
McTaggart and Bosanquet). Russell in particular attempted to rehabilitate the notion of “analysis” 
after its critique in the context of Bradley’s monism, who, in Appearance and Reality, extolled the 
metaphysical knowledge of the world “as a  whole”. But the defense of analysis aims precisely to 
reevaluate  the possibility of  a  realist  and rational  metaphysics  that  does  not  sacrifice intuition, 
argumentation,  and empirical inquiry on the altar  of the spirit  of systems. In this way,  analytic 
philosophy has never been anti-metaphysical  in reality, and above all not at its origin. Again, as 
Kevin Mulligan writes:
The  Fregean  distinctions  between  the  three  domains  of  physical,  psychological,  and  ideal  
entities,  and  between  saturated  and  unsaturated  entities,  the  Russellian,  Moorean,  and 
Ramseyan  metaphysics  of  universals,  relations,  and  values  give  evidence  of  this.  Even  an 
enemy of “metaphysics” such as Carnap is the philosopher of a construction of the world that is 
inserted into a long tradition of attempts stemming from Whitehead, Russell, and Nicod up to  
Goodman.117
Therefore,  it  would  not  be  incorrect  to  claim  that  analytic  philosophy  has  been  the  most 
metaphysical current of the twentieth century. It is moreover this current which has truly inherited 
from the metaphysical ambitions of the early days of phenomenology and the theory of the object, 
thanks to philosophers such as C. J. Ducasse and Roderick Chisholm who continued the Austrian 
tradition in the United States. The history of the analytic-continental “schism” is therefore not so 
much one of a  continuous debate between two theoretical  “blocks”,  but  more the evolution of 
perpetually sliding tectonic plates whose zones of contact are not always very clear, but which can 
form, in little time, chasms and peaks. On the terrain of metaphysics, perhaps the most sensitive to 
these seismic variations, the deepest divide is one of a methodological order inherited from the 
German-Austrian fracture which peaked in Bolzano’s time. But on the doctrinal plane, the most 
original works, which we will now examine, are situated at the border.
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5. Mainstream Metaphysics and Borderline Metaphysics
The term “mainstream metaphysics” was proposed by David Manley in 2009 in order to 
characterize the prevailing realist current in analytic metaphysics, as opposed to the various forms 
of deflationism that  maintain either  that  metaphysical  debates  are  empty (that  is  to say,  purely 
verbal),  or  that  they  are  trivial.  This  typology nevertheless  excludes  philosophers  who  do  not 
subscribe to this mainstream realist conception while claiming to do metaphysics.118 Symmetrically, 
we can group together these authors under the heterogeneous category of borderline metaphysics. 
Two major antagonistic tendencies seem to occupy the terrain of these marginal positions:
(1) “Unrestrained realism”,119 or ontological inflationism. We understand by this expression the 
extension of realism to domains or entities which are not normally taken seriously.
(2) Idealism, or its panpsychist and solipsist variants.
The two most influential positions of the first tendency are undoubtedly Meinongianism and 
modal  realism. The Austrian Alexius  Meinong, in his  Theory of the Object (1904),120 offers an 
exceeding of ontology in his own way, not in order to proclaim the end of metaphysics, but instead 
to widen its field of study. How can we broaden the scope of a discipline that already studies being 
in the most general way? Meinong’s response is simple: ontology considers existent entities; the 
theory of the object,  understood in this  way,  studies the  pure object  – without  caring to  know 
whether  it  exists  or  not.  In  other  words,  Meinong  extends  the  domain  of  investigation  of 
metaphysics, at its highest level of abstraction, to non-existent objects, that is to say, to merely 
possible objects and even to contradictory and therefore impossible objects. If we consider that 
ontology studies what is, it is no longer possible to identify it with the theory of the object. Jean-
François Courtine instead suggests employing the neologism “tinology”, formed from the particle ti  
that in Greek refers to the undetermined “something”. Resorting to the Greek is desirable, because, 
as Courtine and Libera have shown in several studies, the theory of the object is not as radically 
new as Meinong suggests. The origins of “tinology” can even traced to Plato’s Sophist. The stranger 
asks (237a) if we can refer to a non-being (mè on), or more precisely what this expression “non-
being” refers to. Theaetetus responds that it is perhaps quite simply to the “ti”, that is to say, that the 
expression “mè on” refers to the something in general (and not to a being, to on). But the stranger 
immediately rejects this more audacious than naïve hypothesis, by declaring that the “ti” always 
refers to being,  since it is not possible to employ it  “as naked, deprived of everything that has 
being”.  Plato opened the path of tinology more than two millennia before Meinong, though he 
refused to follow it. But the genealogy of this strange discipline did not end with the author of the 
Sophist: after him, Porphyry in Late Antiquity and above all Avicenna in the Middle Ages continued 
analyses in this direction. But it is undoubtedly, even later, the Brentanian reading of Aristotle that 
allowed  Meinong  to  explicitly  conceive  his  new  theory  of  the  object.  If  this  theory  was  not 
unprecedented, it was no longer without posterity. Today, a small “neo-Meinongian” current exists 
that is devoted to exploiting the power of the tinological scheme while attempting to escape from its 
weaknesses, especially with the help of advances in logic – for example, among these heirs, Edward 
N. Zalta, Terence Parsons, and Richard Sylvan (alias Richard Routley).
Another marginal but nevertheless extremely influential metaphysical thesis, modal realism, 
extolled by the great metaphysician David Lewis, has nourished a voluminous literature. The point 
of departure of this theory is the contemporary analysis of modality, that is to say, of possibility and 
necessity, that found a novel formulation with the development of modal logic (by C. I. Lewis in 
particular). Saul Kripke’s semantics of possible worlds, introduced in the 1950s, interprets modality 
in terms of quantification over possible worlds: “x is necessary” becomes “x is true in all possible  
worlds”,  and “y is possible” becomes “y is  true in at  least  one possible world”.  This semantic 
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interpretation allows the clarification of the majority of our vague intuitions concerning modality, 
but the reference to possible worlds remains a mere conceptual tool. David Lewis, on the other 
hand,  in  his  remarkable  work  from  1986,  On  the  Plurality  of  Worlds,  takes  possible  worlds 
“seriously”,  by betting  on their  real  existence.121 This  is  why his  position was given the name 
“modal realism”: Lewis maintained a form of extremely inflationist realism concerning modality; 
each way that a world could be is a way that some world really is. To say that bodies are necessarily 
extended is to say that it is  really true in all the worlds that bodies are extended. Nevertheless, 
Lewis  rejects  several  possibilities:  only  a  single  actual  world  exists,  and,  also,  transworld 
individuals do not exist. Lewis justifies the hypothesis of the existence of possible worlds based on 
its considerable theoretical benefits, but the theory remains difficult to accept for the majority of 
metaphysicians. The posterity of modal realism is paradoxical in this regard: almost no philosopher 
adopts it,122 but many take the pains of discussing it.
The  recent  developments  of  idealism  are  more  marginal,  but  nevertheless  extremely 
interesting. We have already emphasized that today’s anti-realists identify the refusal of realism 
with a refusal of metaphysics simpliciter, as if the mainstream position applied to the entirety of the 
discipline. As a result, the prevailing impression among analytics sometimes seems to boil down to 
a makeshift alternative: either we are realists, or we are fierce adversaries of metaphysics. Yet as 
John  Heil  notes,  Berkeley’s  immaterialism,  for  example,  is  not  a  refusal  or  a  limitation  of 
metaphysics, but constitutes in itself an eminently metaphysical theory that the Irish philosopher 
accepts as such. In fact, from the beginning of the twentieth century up to today, it is certainly on 
the English side that we find the most consistent forms of contemporary idealism. Russell  and 
Moore struggled with much relentlessness against the heroes of this current: T. H. Green, F. H. 
Bradley,  Bernard  Bosanquet,  and  J.  M.  E.  McTaggart.  All  these  philosophers  were  heavily 
influenced by an absolute idealism of the neo-Hegelian type. The most recent representatives of 
British idealism differ considerably from this initial orientation. For instance, John Foster defends a 
veritable subjective (or “phenomenalist”) idealism of the Berkleyian type,123 while Timothy Sprigge 
develops a panpsychist version of absolute idealism.124 In addition, Caspar Hare’s original position 
in favor of an “egocentric presentism” proves to be neither more nor less than a contemporary 
version of moderate solipsism.125
These few examples should suffice to show that so-called continental philosophy does not 
have a monopoly on originality, or even on extravagance. Before discussing further the question of 
ontological parsimony in section 7 and the problem of chimeric speculation in section 8, we will  
attempt to evaluate the wealth of new formal tools designed to guarantee standard criteria of rigor 
and consistency for metaphysics.
6. “Expanding the toolbox”126
The  metaphysician’s  toolbox  has  certainly  grown  since  Aristotle  and  the  preliminary 
symptoms of  syllogism.  It  is  common to  accuse  the  practice  of  analytic  philosophy of  giving 
excessive  attention  to  formal  logic,  but  this  applies  mostly  to  groups  that  privilege  semantic 
analysis. Yet analytic metaphysics is now in touch with the things themselves, rallying a posteriori 
the slogan of the early Husserl: “zu den Sachen selbst !” But contrary to what the early analytic 
philosophers were capable of thinking, and to what a number of metaphysicians still think, logic is 
perhaps not the best tool to study the furniture of the world. For instance, in a play on words, Barry 
Smith objects to ontology being little by little replaced by a “F(a)ntology”,  that is to say, by a 
puppet  ontology privileging  syntactic  characteristics  of  first-order  logic  (predicate  calculus)  as 
conceived by Frege and Russell.127 According to F(a)ntology, the ontological structure of reality is 
captured syntactically by a formalism of the “F(a)” type, where “F” represents what is general in 
27
reality, and “a” what is individual (for example, “the rose is red” can be analyzed in F(a), where F 
represents the property of being red and a represents the rose). But Smith considers “F(a)ntology” 
as a logicist relic of Kantianism, where attention to the structure of language takes precedence over 
attention to the structure of the world itself.
The  critique  of  the  systematic  recourse  to  first-order  logic  does  not  aim  to  deprive 
metaphysics of every formal tool, but instead to give it more appropriate methods. Taking up the 
torch of the Husserlian project of the  Logical Investigations, numerous preeminent philosophers, 
including Barry Smith himself, wore themselves out for thirty-odd years developing a true “formal 
ontology”. The definition that Kevin Mulligan gives is clear:
Formal ontology is to ontology and metaphysics what logic and formal semantics are to the  
theory of signification.128
Let us note that there is a “strong tendency” and a “weak tendency” in formal ontology. In its weak 
version, formal ontology is a mere conceptual tool intended to clarify and refine our intuitions in 
order to guide the development and progress of metaphysics. But the strong version sees formal 
ontology  from  the  perspective  of  a  veritable  axiomatization  of  ontology,  analogous  to  the 
formalization of the foundations of mathematics. However, this perspective is not as novel as it may 
appear. For instance, Nino Cocchiarella employs an explicitly Leibnizian vocabulary to describe 
formal ontology:
The goal of a formal ontology is the construction of a lingua philosophica, or characteristica  
universalis, as explicated in terms of an ars combinatoria and of a calculus ratiocinator, as part 
of  a  formal  theory of  predication.  A formal  ontology should  serve  as  the  framework  of  a 
characteristica realis, and hence as the basis of a formal approach to science and cosmology. It 
should also serve as a framework for our commonsense understanding of the world.129
This definition seems as ambitious as it is enigmatic for the novice, so we will attempt to 
distinguish the primary contemporary orientations of formal ontology. One of the heavily explored 
ways to attempt to endow metaphysics with a sufficiently vast formal base is by referring to the 
theory  of  sets,  which  is  known  to  be  crucially  important  in  studies  on  the  foundations  of 
mathematics. One should be suspicious of the ontological use of the theory of sets, although the 
German philosopher Uwe Meixner, for example, was able to formulate an axiomatic set-theoretical 
version  of  formal  ontology  in  his  Axiomatic  Formal  Ontology.130 Nevertheless,  some 
metaphysicians agree that the theory of sets  is not an appropriate tool for formal ontology, for 
different reasons. Let us mention in particular that:
(1) The theory of  sets  operates  at  the  level  of  abstract  mathematical  entities  and is  not  as 
appropriate for dealing with material or immaterial ordinary entities. Thus, the concepts of 
“limit” and “continuum”, for example, essential for the formalization of ontology,  are not 
fully captured in a formalization of the set-theoretical framework.
(2) The application of the theory of sets to an ordinary domain presupposes the existence of an 
elementary  level  of  irreducible  entities  (Urelemente)  so  as  to  make  possible  the 
reconstitution of upper-level structures from the lower level through more and more far-
reaching sets. In the concrete world, on the other hand, we have no need to isolate a basic 
element as the point of departure for ontological construction.
(3) Sets  are  abstract  entities  defined  entirely  by  the  specification  of  their  members.  It  is 
therefore  difficult  to  give an account  of  the change and transformation  through time of 
concrete objects that can lose or gain parts.
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Instead  of  the  theory  of  sets,  two  types  of  formal  theories  are  therefore  privileged  in 
ontology: mereology and topology. Mereology is an axiomatic formal system that treats relations 
between  parts  and  wholes.131 Following  especially  Whitehead  and  Husserl’s  contributions,132 
mereology’s  early  systematic  developments  emerged  in  the  work  of  the  Polish  philosopher 
Stanisław Leśniewski (one of the distinguished members of the Lvóv-Warsaw school), and then, in 
the name of a “calculus of individuals”, in the work of Henry Leonard and Nelson Goodman. More 
recently,  in  Parts of  Classes,  David Lewis experimented with an original approach, working to 
combine mereology and the theory of sets. Mereology does not employ the term “set”, but rather the 
term “sum”; it formally describes the relations that exist between a part and the whole of which it is  
a part, and how several entities can be mereologically “joined” in order to form a sum (that is to say 
a whole made up of these entities as parts). Accordingly, mereology lets us speak formally about 
ordinary entities, and thus can be applied to immaterial entities as well as to material entities that we 
experience every day.  As for topology, it  lets  us formalize our intuitions about spatial  relations 
between different entities, and about the notion of “limit” (how can a nothing separate something?) 
Note that the response of theoretical physics is not generalizable to formal ontology. For example, 
topology focuses on determining what we mean when we say that  x is analogous to  y. While that 
seems clear enough in the case of concrete objects (x is in contact with y), topology can also study 
abstract  entities.  For  instance,  in  Conceptual  Spaces,  the  Swedish  cognitive  scientist  Peter 
Gärdenfors  recently  advanced  a  true  theory  of  distances in  a  conceptual  space.133 Even  more 
recently, Barry Smith and other metaphysicians have attempted to combine mereology and topology 
by creating “mereotopology”, a formal theory of wholes, limits, parts, and spatial locations.134
Nevertheless,  mereology and topology are not  the only fields of investigation of formal 
ontology.  Especially  in  formal  ontology,  we  find  very  complex  work  on  the  formalization  of 
relations of existential dependence – for example, in Fabrice Correia’s edited monograph of his 
doctoral thesis, Existential Dependence and Cognate Notions.135 This meticulous analysis continues 
Kit Fine’s work on the concepts of foundation and ontological dependence. Over the past few years, 
other studies of formal ontology have also paid attention to non-paradigmatic ontological entities: 
surfaces, holes, shadows, vague objects, knots, etc.,136 or to the problematic status of events.
Thus, formal ontology has had a prosperous development since Barry Smith’s programmatic 
articles from the end of the 1970s. The weird thing about this branch of metaphysics is that it must 
maintain a sort of épochè for the types of entities that really exist, which is why, in the last analysis,  
it coincides quite well with the definition of ontology expressed above in (2a) in section 2. In a 
sense,  this  entails  a formal analysis  of  quodditas without regard for  quidditas.  The question of 
knowing  whether  universals  or  even  material  objects  exist  or  not  matters  little  and  must  not 
influence its inquiry. Formal ontology reveals the formal structure from every possible world, but 
that does not mean that it has no effect on metaphysics, in the sense of (2b), as the determination of  
what  really exists in our world – quite to the contrary. In fact, the recent experiments in applied 
ontology (section 8) are essentially founded on formal ontology. However, if we now come to the 
question  quid? (what exactly exists in our world, what types of entities give it its furniture?), we 
must first examine a serious methodological problem, historically called “Ockham’s razor”.
7. The Principle of Economy, or Ockham’s Imbroglio
It  is  not  necessary  to  reexamine  in  detail  the  history  of  Ockham’s  razor  in  order  to 
understand its importance in contemporary metaphysical debates. Let us only remember that this 
methodological principle first appeared in the context of the medieval problem of universals, and 
that William of Ockham was a vehement defender of nominalism. Nowhere in his works do we find 
any explicit formulation of the principle that takes his name, but the statements which come the 
closest to it are the following: “Numquam ponenda est pluralitas sine necessitate” (plurality must 
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not be postulated without necessity) and “Frustra fit per plura quod potest fieri per pauciora” (it is 
in vain that we make with several what we can make with a small number).137 For Ockham, this 
concerns  defending  the  nominalist  thesis,  judged  more  parsimoniously  than  the  realism  of 
universals. In addition, let us note that this type of principle of economy was already formulated in 
Aristotle,  and that  we owe to  Condillac  the  expression “razor  of  the Nominalists”,  which  was 
transformed into “Ockham’s razor”.
The advantage of a principle of economy in metaphysics is challenged by definitions of 
ontology that, as we have seen, assign to it the task of establishing the inventory of types of existent 
entities. For example, in the following statement:
(1) “Peter is bigger than Paul.”
Does this mean that Peter possesses the property “being bigger than Paul”? Let us consider a second 
statement:
(2) “Peter is 5’11” and Paul is 5’9”.”
Must the fact expressed by statement (1) be added to the fact expressed by statement (2) about the 
respective  sizes  of  Peter  and  Paul?  In  other  words,  can  we  reduce  (1)  to  (2),  or  instead  is  it 
necessary to admit that (1) expresses something more than (2) about the ontological furniture of the 
world? We could easily give more examples of this type. These kinds of problems contribute to 
contemporary formulations of Ockham’s razor, such as the one given by Claudine Tiercelin:
To take metaphysics seriously is to begin by accepting the idea that it is necessary to aim at a  
comprehension of reality in terms of the most limited possible number of ingredients, while also 
ensuring that  we omit  none of  them.  To differentiate,  to  be exhaustive.  That  obliges  us  to 
correctly situate, to reduce, and, in certain cases, to eliminate certain features of the world. In 
this regard, the metaphysician is similar to the physician whose methodology does not let a  
thousand flowers blossom, but follows the most hypocaloric diet possible.138
As such, this principle seems to come from pure common sense. It echos the views of many other 
contemporary metaphysicians. For example, David Armstrong goes on and on about the necessity 
of a “cost-benefit” analysis of metaphysical theses, and concludes: “Other things being equal, I 
shall account the more economical theory the better theory”.139 Also borrowing from the vocabulary 
of  the  economy,  David  Lewis  compares  the  “theoretical  benefit”  of  modal  realism  with  its 
“ontological cost”, in order to ask if the hypothesis is the “cheapest”.140
However,  we can  question  the  validity  of  this  meta-theoretical  obsession  that  seems  to 
ultimately boil  down to a report  of the philosopher-consumer on the quality/price relation of a 
hypothesis (in a hyper-competitive market). Elevated to the place of the fetish object of analytic 
metaphysics, “Ockham’s razor” could well have been the victim of its own celebrity – everyone 
knows that a too-sharp blade presents some danger, at least if we use it carelessly. In 1978, Barry 
Smith warned metaphysicians against the pernicious effects of “Ockhamist reductionism”.  In fact, 
Smith writes that the classical principle of economy – “thou shalt  not multiply entities without 
necessity”  –  has  been  occasionally perverted  into  a  vow of  poverty:  “thou shalt  deny entities 
wherever possible, that is to say, wherever compatible with one’s particular short-term philosophical 
purposes”.141 This perversion historically results from the struggle against ontological inflationism 
exemplified by the “Meinongian jungle”. Throughout the twentieth century and up to the present, 
metaphysics  has  been  quartered  between  Ockhamist  reductionism and  this  type  of  ontological 
inflationism. Kevin Mulligan underlines “a dialectic that is characteristic of the debates in analytic 
metaphysics and ontology – the alternation […] between generous and frugal ontologies”.142
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Rather than speak about the diachronic alternation between these two tendencies, we could 
instead  speak  about  the  competitive  coexistence,  within  each  important  metaphysical  debate, 
between  what  Karen  Bennett  calls  a  “high  ontology  side”  and  a  “low  ontology  side”. 143 For 
example,  in  the  problem  of  material  composition,  the  low  ontology  side  is  occupied  by 
“compositional nihilists”, who deny the existence of composites such as the table, while the high 
ontology  side  is  occupied  by  the  sworn  defenders  of  composition.  Of  course,  this  schematic 
bipartition  could  itself  be  refined  on  the  same  principle:  among  the  defenders  of  material 
composition, we should distinguish the “moderates” (e.g., tables exist, but this group of tables has 
no distinct existence from the tables of which it is composed, as group-of-tables) and the zealots of  
unrestrained mereological composition (if a space contains an object a and a second objet b, there 
exist not two but three entities in this space: a, b, and the mereological sum composed of a and b). 
As Mulligan and Bennett emphasize, whether they are either economic or general, the defenders of 
the different positions generally try to minimize the differences that separate them in order to avoid 
the double-edged Ockhamist blade (the accusation, either, of not postulating enough entities, or, of 
postulating too many of them – no doubt more typical).144 For the high ontologists, this strategy is to 
show that their commitments are “ontologically innocent” (Bennett 2009), and, for their opponents, 
to make declarations of the type: “my list of categories is much shorter than yours […] but I can 
make with my short list everything that you can make with yours” (Mulligan 2000).
Nevertheless, the debates about the most adequate formulation of Ockham’s razor can be 
simplified  by the  distinction  that  Achille  C.  Varzi  makes  between  ontological  exuberance and 
extravagance:145 exuberance is the unreasonable inflation of the number of entities accepted by an 
ontological  theory,  while  extravagance  is  the  acceptance  of  counter-intuitive  and  problematic 
entities,  even in  small  numbers.  This difference is  especially apparent  in  discussions about  the 
restriction  of  mereological  composition.  But,  as  Varzi  notes,  suspicions  of  exuberance  and 
extravagance are sometimes both founded on a false impression. It is therefore more fruitful to be 
prudent and rigorous in evaluating the ontological “cost” of a theory in order to make appropriate 
use  of  Ockham’s  razor.  In  other  words,  the  role  of  intuition  must  not  be  decisive  in  a  good 
conception of ontological parsimony. In the end the principle of economy in its moderate form 
would not be isolated as a useless criteria, and it is not so ridiculous that it would appear to claim,  
according to Quine’s witticism, “to shave off Plato’s beard with Ockham’s razor”.
Therefore, discussions of the most judicious formulation of the “principle of economy” have 
a special place in contemporary meta-ontological debates. But this type of methodological principle 
is not enough to guarantee that metaphysicians will be realists.
8. A Crack in the Ivory Tower
In an article about the problematic situation of contemporary philosophy, Kevin Mulligan, 
Peter Simons, and Barry Smith harshly criticize the horror mundi of analytic metaphysicians, drunk 
from insoluble paradoxes and trifling controversies.146 This critique aims in particular at (1) the 
hyper-specialized debates which have almost no effect on ontology in general and even less on 
“practice”, and (2) the positions which, even within important and legitimate debates, defend not 
only counter-intuitive theses (to the point where it is difficult to sincerely believe them to be true), 
but that are, also, difficult to “concretely” represent.147 The first critique can be aimed especially at 
certain pointless debates about apparent paradoxes, and more generally at all the publications that 
use a very technical approach to relatively trivial or less important problems – the “nitpicky” type. 
The second critique aims, for example, at presentism (the thesis according to which only the present 
exists) which is on certain points as difficult to maintain as solipsism, and, a theory that is very 
difficult to intuitively imagine, four-dimensionalism (the thesis according to which objects exist in 
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four dimensions and have temporal parts). Modal realism, which has given rise to a voluminous 
literature since 1986, also falls within the scope of these accusations: it  is difficult  to sincerely 
believe that an infinity of worlds really exists when we have no means of empirically verifying this 
apparently extravagant thesis.
Whatever we think about these remarks, they remind us that the fact that non-philosophers 
associate  the  term “metaphysics”  with  chimerical  and irrealist  speculations  has  its  basis  in  the 
metaphysicians themselves, and that these metaphysicians must be careful not to isolate themselves 
in the stellar landscape of the questions they are specialists in.148 However, far from renewing the 
common attacks against armchair speculative metaphysics, Mulligan, Simons, and Smith offer to 
their peers some organized excursions to vibrant countries of the modern world. This philosophical 
ride has a name: applied ontology. The very name of this newborn sub-discipline is surprising: by 
definition, ontology is a theoretical inquiry that has no practical consequences. However, the term 
“ontology” began to be used about fifteen years ago by computer scientists, a fact that has for a long 
time  escaped  philosophers.  In  computer  science,  it  designates  a  formal  language  (a  software 
artifact)  designed  to  serve  as  a  framework  for  a  certain  set  of  operations.  In  particular,  the 
development of a computational ontology responds to the problem of the “tower of Babel”: how are 
we able to make common two databases if they do not have the same “vocabulary”, and, more 
precisely, the same taxonomy for classifying the data that they safeguard? The role of ontology in 
the information sciences is to establish an appropriate “universal” framework in order to render the 
databases compatible, for, as in philosophy, the “ontological” commitments of such databases are 
not necessarily apparent, and far from being optimized. Applied ontology continues this type of 
work in  areas  such as  engineering,  biomedicine,  and even geography.  In each case,  it  is  about 
hierachizing entities in a rigorous and appropriate manner that serves the discipline, particularly 
influencing  how  software  organizes  data  and  manages  specific  operations.  In  medicine,  this 
concretely facilitates the classification of computer systems and therefore all of medical knowledge. 
In geography, using ontology clarifies the nature of certain spontaneously utilized entities, posing 
questions  such as:  do geographic entities  like mountains  exist?  What  is  the relation between a 
geographic entity and a  physical  territory?  Can a geographic entity subsist  without  territory or 
definite limits? Are there clear criteria for defining geographic entities? Etc.149 Applied ontology is 
also actively used in the field of social ontology, which has evolved significantly over the past few 
years, following John Searle’s pioneering studies.150 As Peter Simons emphasizes, only time will tell 
if applied ontology can make a name for itself as a useful and functional discipline. We can also 
give a more contemporary and less concrete meaning to the notion of application in metaphysics by 
following John Heil’s conception of ontology examined above. It is possible to “apply” the results  
of  a  general  ontology to  particular  disciplines,  as  philosophy of  mind  applies  to  the  cognitive 
sciences. This allows us to measure the “practical” benefits of metaphysics.
Another way of tackling the question of the relation between theoretical metaphysics and the 
everyday world is through empirical experimentation. At least two types of practices can guarantee 
metaphysics a relation to experience, if mediated by intuition. The first is the thought experiment, 
which has been often shown to have a heuristic role in philosophical investigation in general and 
metaphysics in particular. Thought experiments let us put our spontaneous and impulsive intuitions 
on this or that subject to the test, and rectify certain inadequate ontological postulates as a result. 
The  second  type  of  relation  to  experience  is  found  in  the  more  restrained  development  of 
experimental metaphysics by testing our ontological intuitions on the largest possible number of 
individuals, not in order to correct them, but to evaluate them. Certainly, nothing indicates to us that  
our spontaneous conceptions are right, but this can still serve to guide theoretical research or to 
raise new questions. The problem of the relation of metaphysics to common sense is ancient. Moore 
made good use of the latter in order to “refute” idealism. We have already emphasized that the 
formalization of ontology is not a merciless crusade against intuition, but instead a continuation and 
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correction.  However,  picking up the thread of a tendency running through the entire history of 
philosophy,  certain  studies151  have updated  the  possibility of  a  “naïve  ontology” as  opposed to 
scholarly ontology, by analogy with “naïve physics”. Completely against the idea that “metaphysics 
is  almost  by definition contrary to  common sense”,152   naïve ontology’s  attention  is  directed at 
mesoscopic reality, by not seeking to correct how we naturally perceive it.
After a forced march through some of the principal aspects of contemporary metaphysics 
and ontology, we can close by briefly discussing two more circumstantial aspects of the question: 
the situation of metaphysics in France and the uncertain future of the discipline considered from the 
perspective of the analytic-continental schism.
9. Metaphysics à la française
The place of metaphysics in France is somewhat paradoxical. While French philosophers 
have been counted among the greatest metaphysicians over the past seven centuries, especially in 
the Middle Ages and in modern times, it is no longer in the field of philosophy called “French” 
where metaphysics is the most lively today. The very future of French phenomenology, divided 
since  Merleau-Ponty’s  death  between  a  Heideggerian  hermeneutic  tradition  (Derrida,  Janicaud, 
Courtine) and a rather Husserlian “orthodox” tradition (Henry, Marion, Barbaras), is uncertain, to 
say  the  least,  and  is  hardly  in  a  position  to  be  the  engine  of  the  contemporary  renewal  of  
metaphysics. Certainly,  the salutary works of Jean-François Lavigne,  Patricia Limido-Heulot, or 
Wioletta Miskiewicz have demonstrated that the works of realist phenomenologists, from Daubert 
to Ingarden, have generated a historical interest in France, but these studies do not directly aim to 
further the future of ontology. As Jean-François Courtine recently wrote:
If phenomenology, or better, its “idea”, even its critical idea, must struggle, it is in fact certainly 
against  itself.  I  mean  against  its  full-scale  development  and  the  effects  that  it  induces  by 
labeling and contrastive identification: phenomenology versus analytic philosophy.153
However,  there  are  non-analytic  French  philosophers  who  fully  accept  the  task  of  doing 
metaphysics. In addition to Alain Badiou’s work, the ambitious program of Quentin Meillassoux’s 
“speculative materialism” opens up vast horizons and arouses a growing interest, which is even 
more significant given that its most substantial developments remain to come in the monumental 
work L’inexistence divine.
“French” analytic  metaphysics,  or  rather  analytic  metaphysics  of  French origin,  since  it 
would be frivolous to reduce an international current to a particular language or country, rapidly 
developed after difficult beginnings. We must praise Frédéric Nef’s accomplished work, as well as 
Jean-Maurice Monnoyer and Roger Pouivet in particular, for disseminating the texts, debates and 
history of this  tradition.  Claudine Tiercelin’s  nomination to  the Collège de France represents a 
double victory, because she engages with the analytic current while maintaining strong ties to the 
history of philosophy and the French rationalist tradition, and, also, because it is the first time in the 
history of this illustrious institution that a chair of metaphysics (and more precisely of “metaphysics 
and philosophy of knowledge”) was created. This so-called “unknown of the Collège de France”154 
has done important work on Peirce, Putnam and pragmatism that requires metaphysics to keep its 
feet on the ground, and, in Le ciment des choses,155 does not hesitate to introduce the project of a 
realist scientific metaphysics, based on sound epistemological considerations inspired by the most 
important work on the subject.
However, questioning the contemporary status of metaphysics in France must not prevent us 
from (re)discovering the rich and sometimes forgotten lineage of French metaphysicians of the 
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twentieth century that belong to movements as diverse as spiritualism, personalism, neo-Thomism, 
neo-Platonism, existentialism, etc. Let us mention among them: Jeah Wahl (Traité de métaphysique, 
L’expérience métaphysique), Vladimir Jankélévitch (Philosophie première), Étienne Gilson (L’Être 
et l’essence), Stanislas Breton (Du principe), Louis Lavelle (the four volumes of La dialectique de  
l’éternal  présent),  Nicolas  Berdiaev  (Essai  de  métaphysique  eschatologique),  Gabriel  Marcel 
(Journal métaphysique,  Le mystère de l’être), Maurice Nédoncelle (Intersubjectivité et ontologie), 
Aimé Forest (Du consentement à l’être),  Maurice Blondel (L’être et  les êtres),  Jean-Paul Sartre 
(L’être et le néant), Étienne Souriau (Les différents modes d’existence). Of course, though explicitly 
metaphysical projects, all these works do not have the same importance, but it would be at least 
instructive to reevaluate their positions with respect to contemporary experiences.
While remaining particularly attentive to the French context, it seems necessary to conclude 
this  synthesis  with  some projections  for  the  future  by examining the  question  of  the  analytic-
continental divide once more in an optimistic light.
10. Towards the improbable reunion of metaphysics?
In some French university milieux (the instruction of analytic metaphysics exempted in the 
majority  of  preparatory  classes  and  programs  of  the  agrégation is  sufficient  testimony to  this 
damaging  “forgetting”156),  provincialism,157 which  has  often  contributed  to  understating  the 
importance of analytic metaphysics – with some notable exceptions158 – keeps, in the same way, the 
outdated  binary schema that  contrasts  “French Theory”  with  an analytic  philosophy steeped in 
logical positivism. Neither of the opposing “parties” in contemporary metaphysical debates should 
be reduced to these “trademarks” of the last century. Part of the eristic caricature of the analytic-
continental  “debate”  in  metaphysics  seems  to  come  out  of  rearguard  combats.  Not  that  the 
differences  between  these  two  traditions  are  negligible  or  illusory;  they  are  undeniable,  and 
sometimes appear – we should know – abysmal. However, as the violence of subtle discourse at  
times seems to show, the true problem of the “schism” is not the virulence of the discussions,159 but 
rather the very absence of debates; polemics most often invade the place of discussion, with each 
camp holding to its positions (or its prejudices). “In short, the exchanges between the two camps 
have made matters worse rather than better”,160 as Hans-Johann Glock writes in a book on analytic 
philosophy and its history that has recently been translated into French.
Of  course,  France  has  had  its  “smugglers”:  during  the  generation  1920-1945,  Louis 
Couturat, Jacques Herbrand, Jean Nicod, Émile Meyerson, Jean Cavaillès, Albert Lautman; then 
during the generation 1945-1970,  Gilles Gaston Granger,  Jules Vuillemin;  finally in  the 1970s, 
Jacques  Bouveresse,  Claude  Imbert,  Jean  Largeault,  Paul  Ricœur,  Francis  Jacques  and  Denis 
Zaslawsky.  Today,  they are  even  more  numerous  and some welcome large  audiences.  But  the 
implantation of an analytic ferment in “continental” territory is not enough to make a dispassionate 
dialogue emerge. As Father Van Breda had already said in 1958 to the analytics who faced him: 
“When we see each other, we are sometimes too polite, and very seldom honest. It is the pure and 
simple truth, I believe, to say that there are a lot of continentals who have no real interest in your  
philosophy. And I dare say that it  is the same thing for you towards the continentals.” And, he 
rightly added, “we clarify the discussion so much by saying this openly”.161 Far from improving the 
quality of publications and the debate over antagonistic hypothesis, the effects of the “schism” are 
thus essentially negative, creating a climate of bitterness and pushing some to adopt the martyr’s 
position  (in  France,  analytics  tend  to  feel  like  minorities  and  marginalized,  the  continentals 
“invaded”, and on both sides we find attitudes of  resistance – we certainly saw this during the 
pseudo-scandal of the nomination of Claudine Tiercelin at the Collège de France). Accompanying 
this is the related phenomenon of the reciprocal invisibility of publications.162
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As in every good western, today the question that matters seems more than ever: “Which 
side are you on, boy?”.163 The injunction is particularly perceptible among students who have not 
yet chosen their camp. Of course, the choice in favor of continental philosophy, is made more often 
“by default” than the opposite choice, facilitated by the French tendency to assimilate philosophy in 
general to an exegesis of the history of philosophy. In this respect, it is not insignificant to see some  
French university students  mention the year  of their  “analytic  turn” in  their  academic path,  an 
irrevocable conversion that strongly affects the orientation of a career.
However, as we have fully observed, the adversaries of metaphysics exist in every camp, 
and will mount a fresh attack.164 Can we imagine that these partisans of each side will form a united 
front in the near or distant future? Let us quote Dean Zimmerman’s enlightened commentary:
The impression that there is a deep, principled difference between analytic philosophy and other  
traditions has proven pernicious for the health of metaphysics (and other subfields,  too,  no 
doubt),  separating  natural  allies  and  preventing  healthy  criticism from being  heard  across 
various  analytic/non-analytic  divides.  It  is  to  be  hoped  that  metaphysicians  who  think  of 
analytic  philosophy as  fundamentally  hostile  to  metaphysics  will  discover  that  the  classic,  
substantive questions of their subject are high on the analytic agenda once again – indeed, that  
they have been quite high on the agenda for well over half of analytic philosophy’s history, 
including its earliest chapters. And it is also to be hoped that metaphysicians in analytic circles  
will be open to the best contemporary work originating within metaphysical traditions too long 
alienated from analytic philosophy – e.g.,  neo-Thomism, neo-Platonism, process philosophy, 
personalism, idealism.165 
If we can remain sceptical of Zimmerman’s optimism, we cannot ignore the good intentions of his 
discourse, as evidenced by his illuminating examination of the history of analytic philosophy – 
which had never been a part of its, let us repeat, anti-metaphysical project. Moreover, philosophers 
with very diverse perspectives share some of his conclusions. Alain de Libera writes that “a serious 
confrontation of the points of view is necessary. It is desirable. It is possible.”166 Hans-Johann Glock 
nevertheless articulates the naïve hope of an alliance:
If the analytic/continental contrast has become obsolete, it is not because we have moved on to 
a new and thriving synthesis. But perhaps it has simply been superseded by other divides.167
However, it would be dishonest not to also mention the sceptical commentaries on the question.168 
Frédéric Nef judges that this perspective is premature:
I  do not  believe that  the  moment of  the great  unification between phenomenology and the 
analytic  thought  of  the  epistemological  or  Wittgensteinian  style  has  arrived:  as  in  physics,  
unification will come at the time of a much more powerful theory, and not through collage or by 
joining the various concerned fields.169
For example, Jean-Michel Roy makes use of theoretical physics by unexpectedly taking up Thomas 
Kuhn’s much disputed work on scientific revolutions,170 but nevertheless gives conclusions more 
favorable to the reunion.
During  the  past  few  years,  several  initiatives  have  hinted  at  dialogue.  With  respect  to 
metaphysics, this élan has recently occasioned collections such as Ce peu d’espace autour, which 
philosophers of various persuasions – Tiercelin, Meillassoux, and Marion – have contributed to.171 
But the most important embodiment of metaphysical diversity in France is  perhaps the Groupe 
“Métaphysique  à  l’ENS”  formed  by  Francis  Wolff  some  years  ago,  behind  the  collectively 
published Pourquoi y a-t-il quelque chose plutôt que rien ?172 The idea of a reunion is still fragile. 
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We must reexamine the history of the analytic-continental divide and rediscover the prolific and 
unclassifiable metaphysicians of the twentieth century, from Meinong to Ingarden. Let us quote 
again the generous, though prudent, speech that Jean Wahl made when faced with his illustrious 
Anglo-Saxon audience in 1958:
If there is an agreement, if there were by chance a possible agreement between phenomenology 
and analytic philosophy, perhaps this would be this: truth. But what does the truth mean? This is 
precisely one of the questions we are all faced with.173
Jean Wahl’s remark is not simply rhetorical; what emerges behind the perhaps naïve and illusory 
idea of a reunion of metaphysics is above all the long and complex process that ought to reestablish 
a serious conception of truth and knowledge at the heart of the ontological project. The struggle 
against hereditary enemies – scepticism and deflationism – is the affair of all philosophical currents 
despite their divisions, and today it would be dangerous for whoever wants to be a metaphysician to 
claim to go it alone.
In conclusion, this is why the “ecumenical” (and not syncretical)174 program of the Atelier de 
métaphysique et d’ontologie contemporaines is not simply the expression of student naïveté or of a 
“philosophically correct” compromise. At a time when certain analytic philosophers discuss and 
even defend Heideggerian theses175 and others advocate the reunion of the two traditions embodied 
by  the  trinomials  “Frege-Russell-Wittgenstein”  and  “Brentano-Husserl-Ingarden”  around  recent 
developments  of  formal  ontology,176 it  is  to  be  hoped that  the  project  of  tackling  head on the 
different conceptions of metaphysics judged incommensurable is not completely in vain. To steer 
clear of the polemical effects of the analytic-continental schism without neglecting the often radical 
differences nor collapsing them into an unjustified meta-ontological relativism;177 the exercise is 
perilous, but worthwhile enough to be humbly and collectively attempted.
Notes
Translator’s  note:  Unless  the  citation  is  from an English-language source,  or  has  already been 
translated  into  English,  the  following  and  the  above  translations  are  the  translator’s  own.  The 
translator’s additions are in brackets.
1. Volpi (1999) p.88 (our emphasis). The author closes his article with this conclusion, at the least partisan 
and contestable: “One must  recognize that  nowadays –  given the logico-empirical  reasons deployed by 
Carnap, the logico-analytic reasons shown by Wittgenstein, the historial reasons evoked by Heidegger, and 
the historical reasons indicated by Habermas – one cannot employ the word ‘metaphysics’ without becoming 
suspect. We are no longer concerned with what metaphysics has been, and can no longer concern ourselves  
with a mere repetition of it. We can solely undertake a critical analysis of it.” (Ibid., p.88). Worse still: “One  
cannot resurrect the idea of metaphysics as epistêmê without at the same time continuing the idea of theoria 
as form of life, as supreme praxis. There is a  good reason for saying that since Aristotle, metaphysics has 
made no step forward.” (Ibid., p.89).
2.  Nef (2004).  See in particular  the first  part  (“La Métaphysique n’est  pas morte” [“Metaphysics is  not 
dead”]), which establishes the stakes of the question, the second part (“La mort lui va si bien” [“Death is 
going so well for it”]), which primarily concentrates on the Kantian and Derridean critiques, and the third  
and fourth parts, which examine and refute the Heideggerian thesis of the “ontotheological” constitution of  
metaphysics from a historical point of view.
3. On the history and coherence of the philosophical use of the term “analysis” (especially in Kant and 
Bolzano), see Lapointe (2008). For an examination of the connections between metaphysics and analysis, see 
Zaslawsky (1982).
4. Sections 2 and 3 introduce the main characteristics of metaphysics such as it is practiced, with much  
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vitality, in the “world” of analytic philosophy (which is also, whether we know it or not, our world). On the  
thorny question of the analytic-continental schism, see section 4, and on the consequences of this divide in  
France, see section 9. Finally, on the improbable perspective of a “reunification” of metaphysics, see section  
10.
5. See Zimmerman’s clarification (2004).
6. Wittgenstein [1921] (1993a), p.90.
7. Wittgenstein [1921] (1993a), p.10.
8. Of course, due to a lack of space, we can only offer a pithy and superficial characterization of the question  
that traverses the work of the early Wittgenstein from end to end. For a general introduction to the different  
problems of the Tractatus, see Chauviré (2009).
9. The term “exceeding” [or “elimination”], used by Carnap and Heidegger, is perhaps a bit clumsy. The 
following excerpt, dating from 1931, no doubt better expresses the (necessary) ambiguity of Wittgenstein’s 
attitude towards metaphysics: “I now believe that it would be right to begin my book with remarks about  
metaphysics as a kind of magic. But in doing this I must not make a case for magic nor may I make fun of it.  
The depth of magic should be preserved. Indeed, here the elimination of magic has itself the character of  
magic itself.” (Wittgenstein [1931] (1993b), p.116)
10. Moreover, we can ask what Wittgenstein himself would have thought about the historical and interpretive 
wave that his writings inspired!
11. The manifesto and the principal articles of the Vienna Circle are translated [in French] by Soulez (1985). 
For a detailed introduction to the doctrines and history of the Circle, see Schmitz (2009).
12. Wittgenstein [1921] (1993a), p.31.
13. “Earlier,  when we were reading Wittgenstein’s book [the  Tractatus] in the Circle, I  had erroneously 
believed that his attitude toward metaphysics was similar to ours. I have not paid sufficient attention to the  
statements in his book about the mystical, because his feelings and thoughts in this area were too divergent  
from mine. […] I had the impression that his ambivalence with respect to metaphysics was only a special 
aspect of a more basic internal conflict in his personality from which he suffered deeply and painfully.” 
(Carnap (1963), p.27).
14. Soulez (1985), p.160 [in French]. [Carnap [1931] (1959), p.64-65 in English.].
15. [Hegel [1807] (1931), p.696], cited as an example by Nef (2004), p.156.
16. Translated [in French] in Soulez (1985), p.183. [Translated in English in Schlick [1926] (1979), p.107.].
17.  This  thesis  is  especially directed against  Bergson,  who in his “Introduction to  Metaphysics”  (in  La 
pensée et le mouvant) affirmed the superiority of intuition, as allowing us access to “the absolute”, over  
analysis. In this respect, this text from 1903 launches an essential schema in the later development of the 
analytic-continental  divide.  However,  the  systematic  opposition  between  intuition  and  analysis  is 
detrimental:  every metaphysics, as scientific as tries to be, would never completely be able to avoid the  
recourse to intuition. Even a discipline as rigorous as formal ontology requires some use of intuition (see 
section 6). 
18. Nevertheless, Schlick admits that metaphysical texts can then be read as “conceptual poems”, which,  
following the example of poetry, nourish life and not knowledge. But Carnap is not as charitable. Beginning  
from the principle that “art  is  the appropriate means of expression, and metaphysics is an inappropriate  
means to represent the sentiment of life”, he concludes that metaphysicians are comparable to “musicians  
without musical talent”. [Schlick [1926] (1979), p.110-111]
19. Cf. Benoist (2004): “The odds are that Carnap would have been easily confirmed by the contemporary 
developments of phenomenology, which had clearly placed it on a terrain quite distant from the empirical  
positivity that he objected to in the Heideggerian existential dramaturgy.”
20. Nef (2004), p.158.
21. In addition, we know that the presence of the observer in relation to the experimental device has taken on  
an importance without precedent in quantum physics. In this sense, every “protocol sentence” is dependent 
upon the  scientist  who establishes  it.  This  is  why contemporary theoretical  physics  is  so vulnerable  to 
idealism. Cf. Tiercelin (2011): “it is clear enough that the idealist menace weighs at least as much and even  
more and more on science as on metaphysics” (p.28).
22.  However,  this  argument  still  motivates  some of  the  anti-realist  attacks  concerning the absence of  a 
solution to metaphysical debates today.
23. In reality, Carnap tried, in The Logical Structure of the World, to adopt an attitude of “neutrality” towards 
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metaphysical problems. The logical reconstruction of concepts, according to him, validates neither realism 
nor idealism. But, as Nef (2004) remarks, “if one speaks about the neutrality between two theses A and B, 
this implies that one gives meaning to A and B” (p.167).
24. Heidegger [1935] (1983), p.227-228, cited by Volpi (1999). [Whether deliberately or not, Heidegger’s  
note, found in the annex of the Gesamtausgabe, is absent from extant English translations of the Introduction 
to Metaphysics. The translators, then, ironically repeat Heidegger’s gesture by failing to name the so-called  
adversary...]
25. Sylvan (1997),  p.167 (cf.  infra on the rapprochement between Heidegger and Wittgenstein).  Benoist 
(2004) summarizes the situation thus: “The philosophy of the twentieth century, retrospectively, reflects the  
image of a strange battlefield: as if, at the heart of the 1930s, which certainly constituted the epicenter of this  
century,  the  point  at  which  the  decisive  ruptures  were  accomplished,  underwent  an  entire  series  of 
bewildered movements around the supposed corpse of metaphysics. Later, on the one hand, there are those  
who were persuaded that they inhabited a world ‘after the end of metaphysics’ and who taxed the others with  
a prejudicial naïveté which would have made them remain on this side of the invisible limit thus crossed; on 
the other hand, there were the aforementioned naïve, but who considered the first, justifiably, as the true and  
only metaphysicians, and fought against them as such, believing themselves as the only true possessors of  
the critique of metaphysics.” (p.176).
26. The question of the connection of Heidegger to Husserl is of course more complex. We can nevertheless 
cite Benoist’s (2004) illuminating commentary: “In principle, the Heideggarian critique of phenomenology is 
phenomenological. The phenomenological method that Husserl had put to work is contested in Heidegger’s 
critique, at least at the beginning, as ‘non-phenomenological’ (unphänomenologisch) in its expectations, that 
is to say, as insufficiently phenomenological. It concerns not less, but more, always more describing, not less 
returning to the immanence of the given, but always advancing more in the immanence of the given, by 
modifying the meaning of it – by observing that it cannot correctly be qualified as subject, other than by a 
metaphysical prejudice, but must be it as being, which is always encountered in the dimension of a world”  
(p.172). Or even: “It is from the demand for the return to the very things that everything becomes possible, 
from the moment when this return is no longer understood as fascination [Bennomenheit] and placed at the 
disposition of a constituting consciousness, but instead as a pure letting-be [Seinlassen] of the thing.” (Ibid.).
27. Heidegger [1929] (1997), p.162.
28. Heidegger [1957] (1960), p.48.
29. Heidegger (1972), p.24, cited by J.-L. Marion (1999).
30. Volpi (1999), p.81.
31.  See  in  particular  Nef  (2004)  for  a  critical  treatment  of  the  question.  Pierre  Aubenque,  Jean-Marc 
Narbonne,  Alain de Libera,  Jean-Luc Marion,  and Jean-François  Courtine have shown the limits  of  the 
Heideggerian thesis in various scholarly historical studies. For example, Heidegger especially neglects the 
entire neo-Platonist tradition of henology.
32. Courtine (1999), p.157. One can moreover argue that this “destinal historialism”, which supports the 
thesis of the exceeding of metaphysics, is itself particularly metaphysical. Cf. Benoist (2004): “The difficulty 
of the Heideggarian and post-Heideggerian problematic of the exceeding of metaphysics seems, furthermore,  
to  result  from  its  specifically...metaphysical character.  Indeed,  how  can  one  fail  to  recognize,  in  this 
teleological vision of history in which a principle, named “metaphysics”, would be fulfilled up to its reversal  
into an examination and technological mastery of the world, a larval form of historical idealism? How can  
one believe that “metaphysics” is the foundation of the history of the world? The repetition of structures of 
historical idealism – and, to be more precise, of Hegelian idealism – is all the more absolute, given that it is  
presented in the form of a radical exceeding of this idealism, and speaks about a beyond that gives it the  
intelligibility and the whole of the process, including idealism and its catastrophe.” (p.175).
33. Aubenque (2009).
34. In Heidegger’s own words, this comes down to writing a “history of being as metaphysics”. Heidegger 
[1941] (1973).
35. Courtine (2005). One can place these works in the double lineage of Heidegger and Pierre Aubenque.
36. This is the term that Alain de Libera, in claiming Foucaldian heritage, has also used, notably in his  
monumental study on the emergence of the modern concept of the “subject” in the Middle Ages.
37.  Courtine (2005),  Introduction.  The back cover also states:  “By distinguishing the different  ‘ages’ of 
metaphysics, and by emphasizing the very determined conditions of its (Arab-Latin) interpretation as onto-
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theology, the present research hopes to contribute to relaunching the writing of its histories, which every 
future metaphysics – analytic or not – would not know how to avoid.”
38. The widespread idea in France that certain Heideggerian terms are untranslatable is indicative of the  
venerable indefinable character that that they sometimes seem to be haloed in – without even addressing the 
observations on the philosophical essence of the German language, inheritor of the so-called “originary”  
superiority of the Greek language. Nevertheless, the theme of  Ereignis,  at  the heart of the Heideggerian 
Kehre, is complex, and can only here be vastly simplified.
39. Aubenque (2009).
40.  The  rapprochement  between  Heidegger  and  Wittgenstein  has  become  especially  fashionable  since  
Richard Rorty’s considerations in Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature. It is a good idea, however, to clarify 
that some notes written by the two philosophers clearly indicate that they did not agree with each others’ 
analyses. See M. Marion (2011).
41. For a critical history of this “hermeneutic turn” of phenomenology, see Grondin (2003).
42. According to Grondin (2003), there are three major conceptions of “hermeneutics” in Heidegger: the first  
hermeneutic  of  facticity  (1923),  the  hermeneutic  of  Dasein in  Being  and  Time (1927),  and  the  later 
hermeneutic of the history of metaphysics.
43. Gadamer (1991), p.22, cited by Rodier (2011).
44. Ricœur [1975] (1977), p.311.
45. Gadamer (2000b), p.703-704, cited by Rodier (2011).
46. Gadamer (2000c), p.85, cited by Rodier (2011). [Gadamer (2003), p.79]
47.  Gadamer  (2000a),  p.210,  cited  by  Rodier  (2011).  For  Gadamer,  this  type  of  experience  of  the  
transcendent is encountered especially in recognition and gratitude.
48. Gadamer (1982), p.11, cited by Rodier (2011). The philosopher is careful to specify that, even and above  
all “in our scientific age”, “we need not apologise for asking questions which we cannot answer.” We can ask 
why our age would be more “scientific” than, for example, in the Renaissance or ancient Greece – which  
were just as “philosophical”, if that makes any sense. The strategy of denigrating “technicist” scientificity to  
the  benefit  of  an  authentic philosophical  questioning  is  undoubtedly  a  Heideggerian  heritage.  For  an 
examination of the questions “how” and “why”, which were supposed to distinguish science and philosophy, 
see section 2.
49.  Gadamer  (1994),  p.110,  cited  by  Rodier  (2011).  Moreover,  we  can  amuse  ourselves  by  replacing 
“metaphysics” with “faith” without the meaning of the phrase being radically transformed...
50. Derrida (1997), p.4.
51. Ibid.
52. Aubenque (2009). 
53. Ibid., p.60.
54. Ibid., p.61 (our emphasis).
55. Ibid., p.63.
56. Nef (2004) (p.180) takes up the analyses of Kevin Mulligan and Vincent Descombes, which highlight the 
main Derridean “sophisms”. Sylvan (1997) develops a “deconstruction of deconstruction” through dialethic 
logic – one of the forms of paraconsistent logic – which avoids the paradoxes connected to self-referentiality.
57.  Aubenque (2009) locates this attitude in the lineage of neo-Platonism and Renish mysticism,  which 
Derrida discussed in several works.
58. Habermas [1988] (1993).
59. Ibid., p.34.
60. Ibid., p.29.
61. Nef (2004), p.89.
62. Ryle (1932). 
63. Ibid., p.143.
64. Ryle thanks Kant for having clarified the concept of existence in his refutation of the ontological proof,  
but nevertheless reproaches him for not having gone far enough – that is to say, for not having seen that  
“God” is not the logical subject of the statement “God exists”.
65. In The Concept of Mind (1949), Ryle attacks mental concepts so as to reveal the absurdity of the problem 
– eminently metaphysical – of mind-body dualism.
66. For a more developed critique of “linguisticism” in general, see section 3.
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67. Putnam (2004) presents the most recent formulation of it.
68. A mereological sum is a whole that results from the “mereological” fusion of its parts, that is to say, that 
adds something to the autonomous existence of entities of which it is composed as whole. Let us take the 
example of a space containing two objects. For a defender of the existence of mereological sums, this space, 
in  reality,  contains  three  entities:  two objects  and  the  “whole”  constituted  by these  two objects.  For  a  
defender of the inexistence of such sums, on the contrary, the room only contains two entities, and the fact  
that one can consider the set that contains these two entities as elements adds nothing more to the existence 
of these two entities. On this point, see sections 6 and 7.
69. Putnam (2004), p.43.
70. Ibid., p.85.
71. Putnam thinks that metaphysics runs counter to common sense, whereas Peirce, who was himself an 
illustrious representative of pragmatism,  thinks,  on the contrary,  that  metaphysics  is  partly connected to 
common sense, as long as we have a critical approach towards it. Cf. Peirce (1931), §129.
72. Nef (2004), p.25.
73. La Fontaine, “The Cat Metamorphosed into a Woman”, Book II, fable 18, v.41-42.
74. J.-L. Marion (1999), p.30. The comparison with Jean-Luc Marion’s earlier statement almost makes one 
smile: “Obviously, since metaphysics has reached its end, either as a completion with Hegel, or as a twilight 
with Nietzsche, philosophy has only been able to genuinely continue in the form of phenomenology” (J.-L.  
Marion and Planty-Bonjour (1984), p.7).
75.  Benoist  (2004),  p.180.  The pusilanimous  exhortation to  always  go beyond everything in  theoretical 
matters,  and,  with  even more  complacency,  to  exceed the  exceeding,  was  one  of  the  twentieth-century 
leitmotivs, sometimes in the form of a Hegelian or Nietzschean vestige (foreshadowing, for our new century,  
the "post-" era: postmodernism, post-structuralism, and of course post-metaphysical thought). Why couldn’t  
metaphysics continue to calmly pose the important problems that an age-old tradition, that one pretended to 
confine to an antique shop, had bequethed it? “We were not convinced that philosophy had really changed in 
nature,  or,  a fortiori, was  beginning to  disappear  – this  threat  was presented as  its  ultimate  hope –  or 
transforming into another fundamentally different type of thought. Yet phenomenology is certainly not the 
abyss where it ought to be swallowed up and/or regenerated once and for all.” (p.175).
76. “Whence  the  tempting  representation,  shared  today  at  least  by  a  large  number  of  French  
phenomenologists, of a phenomenology that would come ‘after the end of metaphysics’, as its  completion 
and its natural dissolution.” (Benoist (2004), p.173).
77. Let us quote Jean-Luc Marion again, this time to illustrate this rhetoric: “metaphysics [...] does not cease 
to go beyond itself. [...] Moreover, the successive shifts of historically accomplished metaphysics [...] already 
in fact mobilize this intrinsic property of metaphysics – to exceed, to exceed the exceeding,  in short  to  
exceed itself.” (J.-L. Marion (1999), p.33).
78. Putnam (2002), p.101.
79. Engel (2010).
80. Tiercelin (1995), p.401.
81.  Nef (2004).  Note however that  the second part  of  Qu’est-ce que la métaphysique ?,  paired with an 
essentially critical first part intended to rehabilitate metaphysics from the criticisms of its famous detractors,  
concentrates on the diverse developments of analytic metaphysics. Our synthesis attempts to approach non-
analytic metaphysics at the risk of skimming over the question and of invalidating the supposed cohesiveness  
of the discipline and of its practices (on the question of this “ecumenicalism”, see section 10).
82. On this point, see Tiercelin (1995) as well as Brisson’s (1999) illuminating analysis.
83. Varzi [2005] (2011).
84. As for Meinong, his “theory of the object” must, according to him, go further than ontology (even if for 
convenience his position is comparable to (2a)). The second proposition, to summarize it clearly by avoiding 
this type of circumstantial confusion, consists, contrary to (1), in asserting the primacy of  quodditas over 
quidditas.
85. Varzi [2005] (2011), p.25.
86. Smith (2003), p.155.
87. On the contemporary conception of formal ontology, see section 6.
88.  We neglect the the fact that, as Frédéric Nef has emphasized in several places, the difference between  
physical inquiry and metaphysical inquiry could not come down to a simplistic distinction between “how” 
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questions and “why” questions. Rather, there are two types of “how” questions and two types of “why”  
questions that one ought to distinguish: “Of course the classification of questions into how and why does not 
cover up the distinction between physical type questions and metaphysical type questions. In fact, four types  
of theoretical questions exist: physical why questions (why is the sky blue?), physical how questions (how do 
the physical laws emerge from primordial chaos?), metaphysical why questions (why is there order?) and  
metaphysical how questions (how do objects become concrete?).” (Nef (2007), p.24, n.32).




92. On the inappropriate and ambiguous character of the term “continental”, see section 4 and note 157.
93.  More  precisely,  as  Benoist  (2004),  p.172  writes:  “There  is  an  anti-metaphysical  component  in 
phenomenology in the sense that  it  refuses pre-constituted theories  that  separate us,  or  are  supposed to  
separate us, from phenomena. But this post-positivist sense of the critique of metaphysics in no way excludes  
the objective of a metaphysics, which is presented by Husserl himself as its ultimate, and as yet unachieved,  
accomplishment of phenomenological research.”
94. Benoist (2004), p.167. On the relations between phenomenology and analytic philosophy, see section 4.
95. Mulligan suggests in several places that the most adequate way of defining a “continental” approach 
towards  metaphysics  is  to  say that  it  holds  on  to  a  sort  of  continuum where  we find,  at  one extreme, 
historical, sociological, and political reflections (inheriting partly from the Hegelian dialectic and from its  
materialist inversion in Marx), and, at the other extreme, a philosophy of existence that instead focuses on 
idiosyncratic experiences.
96. We think mostly of Alain Badiou’s and Quentin Meillassoux’s works, which we will examine again in  
section 9.
97. If we believe Žižek, “postmodernism” (from Heidegger to ecology by way of Marxism, feminism, and 
the avatars of deconstruction!) is on a crusade against the Cartesian subject and the Hegelian pretension to 
absolute knowledge. But his own use of the term “metaphysics” is at the very least fluctuating, for example,  
in the following phrase:  “The ‘postmodern’ epoch demands that  we abandon metaphysical  and political  
projects because they equivocate between totality and totalitarianism.” (Žižek (2011)).
98. Tiercelin (1995), p.478-481.
99. Putnam (1992), p.187.
100. Heil and Martin (1999).
101. Ibid.,  p.36.  Aiming in particular  at Ayer and Wisdom, Heil and Martin state:  “Rather than purging 
philosophy of ontology, the practice of semantic ascent has rather served as an evasion or obfuscation of  
ontological  views.  Proponents  have pretended that  entailments  were  possible  when they are  not.  When 
entailments have had to be abandoned for nonentailment ontological reductions, they have refused to see  
these reductions as ontological and have labeled only the entailment form as phenomenalism, etc.” (Ibid.,  
p.57, n.2.).
Cf. also Heil (2003), p.3: “An adequate conceptualization of the world and our place in it is founded, not on  
the analysis of concepts, but on an adequate ontology. Ontology is not an analytical enterprise. Earlier I  
noted that in engaging in ontological investigation we are endeavouring to make sense of issues we should  
otherwise find perplexing. The issues in question arise in the sciences, in the humanities, and in everyday 
life. To this extent they include an ineliminable empirical element. My belief is that, if we get the ontology 
right, these issues will take care of themselves in the sense: the remaining questions will be largely empirical  
hence susceptible to techniques we standardly deploy in answering empirical questions.”
102. Heil (2003).
103. The problem does not concern so much the statement of the relation of supervenience, but rather its 
foundation, that is to say truth-making capacity.
104. Chalmers, Manley, and Wasserman (2009).
105. Peacocke (1999), chapter 1.
106. Ibid., p.1.
107. As Mulligan, Simons, and Smith (2006) remark. It is partly this tendency that has caused some to accuse 
analytic philosophy of being technicist and “scholastic”.
108. Mulligan (1998) employs, with the same irony, the expression “The Great Divide”. Engel (1997) prefers 
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to soberly name his dialogue La Dispute. The rather recent term “schism” (for example in Roy (2010)), more 
or less precisely datable by historians, reveals the common origin – notably in Brentano and his students – of  
certain traditions unanimously recognized as antagonistic. For an insight into the state of the situation in 
France and some (optimistic) perspectives on the future, see sections 9 and 10.
109. Cahiers de Royaumont (1962).
110. Dummett (1993).
111. Daubert (1877-1947), who Husserl recognized as one of his most brilliant students, was rediscovered 
thanks to the work of Karl Schuhmann and Barry Smith.
112. Reinach (1883-1917) was the leader of the phenomenological school of Munich. Specifically, he was  
the first philosopher – before Russell – to propose an examination of negative states of affairs.
113. Ingarden (1894-1970) was, perhaps with the exception of Hartmann, one of the greatest non-analytic 
metaphysicians of the twentieth century. In particular, he was one of the primary opponents of the idealist  
turn of his master Husserl, though they nevertheless maintained close ties of friendship. His magnum opus, 
Spór  o  istnienie  Świata  [The  Controversy  on  the  Existence  of  the  World],  a  monumental  1700 pages, 
introduces an original and exhaustive ontology that, we can only regret, has been so little studied.
114. Mulligan (2000), p.5.
115. Alain Badiou does not hesitate to label this supposed archaism with the adjective “scholastic”, using the 
pejorative meaning of the term inherited from a Romantic distrust for the medieval disputatio and fantasized 
obscurity of the Gothic age. This unspoken devaluation that the philosophers of the Middle Ages suffer from 
is due to their relatively marginal place in philosophical instruction in France – the same assessment can be  
made, more or less, of the (pagan) philosophers of Late Antiquity.
116. Kotarbiński (1966), p.514, cited by Przełęcki (1989).
117. Mulligan (2000), p.5. 
118. Here we touch on the confusion in certain debates on anti-realism, which is sometimes characterized as 
any opposition to the realism of  the  external  world,  and other times characterized as any opposition to 
metaphysics in general. Yet, as we will see, in the twenty-first century we can certainly be metaphysicians  
without being realists in these precise senses.
119. The ambiguity of the term “realism” in contemporary metaphysics is well-known. Generally, realism 
indicates  the  position  that  accepts  reality  independent  of  a  certain  type  of  entity.  The  most  recent  
employment of the term refers to the realism of the external world – the thesis according to which the world 
exists independently of the consciousness that we have of it.  Nevertheless, there exist virtually as many 
forms of realism as entities we can bestow reality upon: realism of universals (universals exist independently 
of our concepts), mathematical realism (mathematical entities exist by themselves), moral realism (moral  
values exist by themselves), “alethic” realism (an objective truth exists),  modal realism (possible worlds  
exist), “Meinongian” realism (even non-existent objects have a form of subsistence), etc. Section 7 develops 
the question of the ontological inflationism by examining the problem of Ockham’s razor.
120. Meinong (1904).
121. Lewis (1986).
122. Very recently, Takashi Yagisawa (2009) formulated a heterodox version of modal realism.




127. Smith (2005). The same assessment has been made by numerous metaphysicians; cf.  Nef’s (2009),  
Varzi’s (2005) and Heil’s (2003) clarifications.
128. Mulligan (2000).
129. Cocchiarella (2007), p.23.
130. Meixner (1997).
131. The most complete synthesis on mereology remains Simons (1987).
132. Cf. the third Logical Investigation. On Husserlian mereology, see Fine (1995).
133. Gärdenfors (2000).
134. Cf. in particular Casati and Varzi (1999).
135. Correia (2005).
136. Cf. for example Casati (2008).
42
137. From the Quaestiones et decisiones in quattuor libros Sententiarum Petri Lombardi (Book II) and the 
Summa Totius Logicae, respectively. An expression is often attributed to Ockham, but absent from his works:  
“Entia  non  sunt  multiplicanda  praeter  necessitatem”  (it  is  not  necessary  to  multiply  entities  except 
necessity).
138. Tiercelin (2002), p.565.
139. Armstrong (1989), p.20.
140. Lewis (1986).
141. Smith (1978), p.43.
142. Mulligan (2000).
143. Bennett (2009).
144. But having done this, they unavoidably attract anti-realist suspicions: the more antagonistic positions  
appear the same, the more the debate, however fierce, seems vain (according to the idea that, more or less, 
the metaphysicians who debate are in agreement). As Bennett (2009) shows, this is largely an optical illusion 
that we should blame the metaphysicians themselves for, and attribute to their obsession with not wanting to  
be labeled as ontological extravagants.
145. Varzi [2005] (2011).
146. Mulligan, Simons, and Smith (2006).
147. Bennett (2009) notes that in the discussion of anti-realism, all the metaphysical debates are worthless, 
and some are privileged targets.  For example,  for  the adversaries of ontology,  the problems of material  
composition and co-location are symptomatic of an empty or trivial debate. Nevertheless, the critique by 
Mulligan, Simons, and Smith has nothing to do with the anti-realist attacks, but rather, for these committed 
realist metaphysicians, with the results of their own practice.
148. Claudine Tiercelin, who claims a pragmatist  heritage,  has also declared in an interview on the site  
www.mediapart.fr : “I think that thought does not merit an hour of pain if it does not allow us to better direct  
and guide ourselves in our actions”.
149. Cf. Casati, Smith, and Varzi (1998).
150. Cf. Ehrlich, Mark, and Smith (2008).
151. Cf. Casati and Smith (1993).
152. Putnam (2002), p.124.
153. Courtine (2007), introduction.
154. As Aude Lancelin recently described her in an article in the Nouvel Observateur (14 June 2011), which 
in any event has no other aim than to fuel sterile polemical fire, and demonstrates complete ignorance of  
Claudine Tiercelin’s work. The open letter from Jacques Bouveresse to Aude Lancelin published on the blog 
of the publisher édition Agone (http://blog.agone.org) sums up this distorted and quasi-tauromachian media 
manipulation of the analytic-continental debate.
155. Tiercelin (2011).
156.  For my  mémoire de khâgneux,  I  remember a professor of philosophy claiming that  metaphysics is 
limited grosso modo to three questions – “substances and accidents”, the problem of the existence of God,  
“why is  there  something  rather  than  nothing?”  –  and  explaining,  through  narrow-mindedness  on  these 
subjects, the fact that the jury du concours of the ENS is not always inclined to include metaphysics in its 
philosophy program.
157.  In  his  open  letter  to  Aude  Lancelin,  Jacques  Bouveresse  talks  about  “philosophical  nationalism”, 
especially in response to Alain Badiou’s lapidary remarks on the transformation of the Collège de France into  
“an old-fashioned sub-prefecture of American analytic philosophy, favoring the conservative consensus to 
the detriment of the contemporary innovator”. Let us remark in addition that there is no reason to say that  
metaphysics, such as it is actually practiced in the world of analytic philosophy, would be exclusively, even  
essentially  American – except to include, among others, in this fantasized America: Australia, the United 
Kingdom,  a  good  part  of  “continental”  Europe  (in  particular,  Scandinavia,  Poland,  Switzerland,  Spain, 
Germany, Italy, and even France), and Japan. Conversely, “French theory” is particularly in vogue in the  
United  States,  and  certainly  not  in  the  departments  of  philosophy,  but  within  disciplines  as  varied  as 
literature, sociology, anthropology, and the diverse “cultural studies” waning to infinity on the same model  
(gender studies,  ethnic studies,  postcolonial studies,  etc.)  Moreover, this  is  precisely why the distinction  
analytic  versus  continental reflects  a  blatant  imbalance and incoherence,  by opposing a methodological 
criteria  employed  in  several  directions  to  a  geographic  criteria  that  is  at  the  very  least  vague  and  
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questionable. Let us recall, with Mulligan (1998), Bernard Williams’ witticism: dividing philosophy between 
analytic philosophy and continental philosophy comes down to dividing cars between Japanese cars and cars 
with rear-wheel drive... Cf. also Smith (2006).
158. Let us mention especially the EHESS [École des hautes études en sciences sociales], to a certain extent 
the  ENS  [École  normale  supérieure]  (although  the  physical  distance  separating  29  and  45  rue  d’Ulm 
sometimes seems to ironically reflect the tendencies of philosophical orientation), and finally, last but not 
least,  the Collège de France.  Claudine Tiercelin’s  remarks on this subject  are rather  bitter:  “an analytic  
philosopher, whatever one can say about a so-called improvement of things, and on the ceaselessly growing 
group of people who would like to see him given a place in the institution, continues to be tolerated even as  
he does not truly partake in the ‘normal’ institutional landscape.” (online interview at www.mediapart.fr). Let 
us not forget that it was at Althusser’s demand that Jacques Bouveresse gave courses on analytic philosophy 
at the ENS from 1966-1969. Unfortunately, the experiment, attempted again by Frédéric Nef some years ago, 
did not seem to have had the same success. We must no doubt see there the persistence of deep-rooted  
prejudices against analytic philosophy – to which a slightly vague conception of a menacing linguistic turn is 
still associated, by many newly minted students from preparatory classes.
159. We could evoke the “gigantomachic” paradigm of the controversy that divided Searle and Derrida; the  
purely  polemical  appearance  and  the  personal  nature  of  the  disagreement  still  often  overshadow  our 
memories of the content of the debate. Engel (2011), being ironic about the cult of the spectacular, identifies 
this as a journalistic tendency towards contemporary philosophy: everyone knew that “Derrida’s reading on 
Searle was much more droll than the reverse”.
160. Glock (2008), p.257.
161. Cahiers de Royaumont (1962), p.344.
162. Cf. Zimmerman (2004). This assessment is not always valid in what we could call, at the risk of creating 
a geography of the phenomenon, “border zones” – of which the rue d’Ulm could be a pertinent example.
163. Zimmerman (2004), p.ix.
164. If the critique of metaphysics surpasses the limits of the analytic-continental divide, its defense should 
be everyone’s affair. For instance, the habitual rapprochement between the Wittgensteinian and Heideggerian 
critiques of metaphysics – the limits of which we have certainly emphasized – nevertheless suggests that the  
arguments invoked by metaphysicians on all  sides in order to defend their discipline could be the same. 
Examples of such a common argumentative line can be found in the sketch that Tiercelin makes of it (1995), 
in the first part of Nef (2004), and, to a certain extent, in Tiercelin’s (2011) substantial developments.
165. Zimmerman (2004), p.xxi.
166. Libera (1999).
167. Glock (2008), p.257.
168. Claudine Tiercelin is one of the most sceptical in France, despite having for a long time maintained the  
dialogue. Questioned on philosophical eclecticism, she responds: “After being very broadly devoted to it,  
believing to do good, and in trying to reconcile, in a word, irreconcilable philosophical styles, I had admitted  
to myself that, under the cover of a welcoming pluralist attitude, we had above all succumbed to intellectual 
laziness, and, in order to finish, that we lost our soul there. In philosophy, it is necessary to choose and to be 
committed. Philosophy is in this respect like life: an executioner of possibilities. Everything is not possible at 
the same time.” She still asserts: “I believe I am, of all the French philosophers, among those who has been  
the most ready to listen to continental philosophy, and who also fosters the most links of friendship and 
affection  with  a  good  number  of  continental  philosophers.”  But  her  conclusion  is  definitive:  “No 
reconciliation between the two seems possible for me, and all in all I often have the impression of having, 
quite  simply,  another  profession.  I  quite  often  feel  closer  to  the  way a  good number  of  my Peruvian, 
Taiwanese,  or  Greek  analytic  colleagues  think  and work  than  I  am with  some  French  ‘philosophers’.”  
(Online interview on the website www.mediapart.fr)




173. Cahiers de Royaumont (1962).
174. Unless considering a potential positive sense of philosophical syncretism, following Mulligan (1993): 
“‘Syncretism,’ in one of its senses, is a pejorative term. But, of course, the fact that a philosopher combines 
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two ideas  or  more,  however  distinct  their  provenance,  is  never  by itself  a  bad  thing.  It  is  completely  
unimportant  where  a  good  idea  comes  from.  Syncretic  philosophy is  bad  philosophy only  when  it  is 
combined with the illness I called underdetermination [of positions and problems]: in particular, it is only  
when  the  links  between  philosophemes  from very different  traditions  or  heterogeneous  sources  –  e.g.,  
topology and  Freud  –  are  not  made  out  that  we  get  the  characteristically  Continental  variety  of  free  
association of ideas.” (p.136, our emphasis).
175. See for example McDaniel (2009), Eisenhardt (1990), D’Agostini (2002), and Rundle (2004).
176. Cf. Smith (1978).
177. By “ontological relativism”, we do not mean what this expression means in Quine, nor even in Putnam’s 
pluralism,  but  instead  the  attitude  that  transpires  in  certain  works  of  “comparative  metaphysics”  or  
anthropological metaphysics.
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